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ABSTRACT

The dissertation attempts to empirically verify the Oliva/
Capdevielle Cusp Catastrophe Theory Model of Collective Bargaining
Prior to this time, no direct tests of catastrophe theory have
been made in the social sciences.

This study tries to directly

use the equations of the model to predict system behavior.
Data were gathered by use of a laboratory experiment which
included the playing of a collective bargaining game and the
administration of questionnaires.
into 4 two-team groups.

Sixteen students were divided

Each group contained one management and

one union bargaining team.
Actual data from the bargaining systems were compared with
predicted data from the model using the Pearson Product Moment
Coefficient of Correlation.

Overall results yielded a correlation

coefficient of .70 which is suggestive of the model's validity.
The dissertation includes an overview of the cusp cata
strophe theory model, as well as a basic typology of standard mode
found in collective bargaining.
developed from the experiment.

The appendix contain the raw data

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the Study

"In the past three decades collective bargaining has
become an important part of the system of making economic
decisions in the United States.
Critical decisions con
cerning utilization of resources and distribution of the
proceeds from production have come within the scope of
the bargaining process. Today, few business managers or citizens - are insulated from the consequences of
collective bargaining."
Arnold R. Weber^
Written in 1960

Today, almost twenty years later,the statement by Weber is
even more true, particularly in light of a situation when there are
growing demands for an apparently shrinking supply of resources.
Unfortunately, our success at modelling the collective bargaining
situation has been somewhat limited.

Walton and McKersie

2

suggest

that most research has been focused on specific and limited situations
only, with little effort made to develop models that encompass major
areas within collective bargaining.

One reason for the difficulty

has been the lack of techniques that can handle abrupt changes in

Arnold Weber, The Structure of Collective Bargaining:
Pro
blems and Perspectives, The Free Press of Glencoe, Inc., New York,
1961, p. 7.
2

Anatol Rapoport, Game Theory As A Theory of Conflict Resolu
tion, D.. Reidel Publishing Company, Boston, 1974, Vol. 2, p. 1.
1

2

the behavior of the system such as strikes or lockouts.

However,

recently, a relatively new area of mathematics called catastrophe
3

theory has opened up some interesting possibilities.

Rene Thom's

book Structural Stability and Morphogenesis provides the conceptual
framework for catastrophe theory.

During the past six years, appli-

cations of the theory have been attempted in physics,

4

,
5
biology,

economics,^* and psychology,^ focusing particularly on system
dynamics where sudden transitions are an integral part of the
behavior pattern.
3
Rene Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, W.A.
Benjamin, Inc., New York, 1975.
4
E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers, 19721977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading Mass., 1977,
pp. 16-17.
~*E.C. Zeeman, "Differential Equations for the Heartbeat and
Nerve Impulse;" "Primary and Secondary Waves in Developmental
Biology;" "A Clock and Wavefront Model for the Control of Repeated
Structures During Animal Morphogenesis," coauthored with J. Cook;
"Gastrulation and Formation of Somites in Amphibia and Birds;"
"Dialogue Between A Biologist and a Mathematician;" "Brain Modelling;"
"Duffing's Equation in Brain Modelling." All found in Catastrophe
Theory:
Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 81-301.
^W.S. Brown, "An Economic Application of Catastrophe Theory,"
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Colorado, 1977. E.C. Zeeman,
"On the Unstable Behaviour of Stock Exchanges," "Conflicting Judge
ments Caused by Stress," Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers, 19721977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977,
pp. 361-385. Yves Balasko, "The Behavior of Economic Equilibria:
A
Catastrophe Theory Approach," Behavioral Science, (September 1978),
Vol. 23, pp. 375-382.
^W.S. Dochens, III, "Induction/Catastrophe Theorv:
A Behav
ioral Ecological Approach to Cognition in Human Individuals,"
Behavioral Science (March 1979), Vol. 24, pp. 94-111. E.C. Zeeman,
et. al., "A Model for Institutional Disturbances," Catastrophe

3

g
In 1977 Oliva and Capdevielle

developed a model of col

lective bargaining using catastrophe theory as its underlying
structure.

And, like most "applications" of catastrophe theory in

the social sciences, the model seemed to have fairly high face
validity and offered some interesting conclusions.

But if a model

is ultimately to be of any value it must be tested empirically.
9

Murthy

developed a rough empirical test of the model's descriptive

effectiveness in 1978 by developing six operational hypotheses
regarding the movement of the independent variables.
That is, by looking at the descriptive model, Murthy was
able to develop six hypotheses about the movement of the independent
variables and their

concomitant

results in terms of the expected

bargaining behavior.^
To measure the independent variables Murthy developed a col
lective bargaining game which was played by 35 four person groups.
As each team completed various sections of the game, a questionnaire

Theory:
Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 387-401.
Brian R. Flay,
"Catastrophe Theory in Social Psychology:
Some Applications to
Attitudes and Social Behavior," Behavioral Science, (September 1978),
Vol. 23, pp. 335-350.

g
Terence A. Oliva and Christel M. Capdevielle, "Collective
Bargaining as a Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of the Academy of
Management, 1977, pp. 177-181 (paper in the Proceedings is different
from that actually presented due to revisions).
9

H.S.K. Murthy, "An Experimental Evaluation of the Descrip
tive Effectiveness of the Cusp Catastrophe Model in Simulated
Bargaining Situations," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Louisiana
State University, 1978.
~^Ibid., p. 54.

4

was administered to the participants which yielded a bargaining
intensity for the union and management representatives, as well as
an estimate of the actual behavior of the overall system.

By

referring to his hypotheses, Murthy then predicted the expected
behavior of the system.

Using a Chi-Square test over the 258 data

points, he found there to be no significant difference between the
expected frequencies and the observed frequencies at the .05 level.
The approach used by Murthy is essentially an empirical
test of the qualitative nature of the model since it did not make
explicit use of the mathematics of the model.

And, as such, it is

an indirect and somewhat gross test even though the results are
positive.
It is the purpose of this study to develop a direct test of
the model by explicitly using the mathematics of the model to predict
behavior based on various combinations of the input variables as
found in real world situations.

Statement of the Problem

The problem to be examined by this dissertation is to
develop a direct empirical test of the Oliva/Capdevielle Catastrophe
Theory Model of collective bargaining by:
(1) developing empirical measures for the model's independent
variables, viz. management and union bargaining
intensities,

(2) using the equation of the catastrophe surface to predict
bargaining behavior,
(3) develop empirical measures of the bargaining system's
behavior,
(4) and finally, to compare the model's predicted behavior
against the system's actual behavior.

Significance of the Problem

The significance of the problem may be judged in several
ways.

First, there are almost no empirical tests of catastrophe

theory models in the social sciences.

In fact, the only one found

in the references listed earlier is that of prison disorders.

To

date, all so-called applications have been merely descriptive.
Since the theory has been advanced as a new modelling structure that
represents a quantum jump over one's ability to describe social
science situations, it is important to ascertain the appropriateness
of that assertion through empirical testing.
Secondly, as stated earlier, models of collective bargaining
have been severely limited in their description of bargaining.

The

model being tested seems to have new potential for describing the
overall bargaining situation beyond that of an "optimal" determina
tion of wages that is not reflected in real-world behavior of
bargaining decisions.

That is, the model allows for the qualitative

inclusion of bargaining with mathematical rigor.

6

Lastly, since this type of modelling technique is not found
in the bargaining literature, its validation would help researchers
by providing a new tool for analysis which has not been used before.
In this sense the direct empirical validation of the model will go
a long way in pushing back the frontiers of knowledge in this area
of collective bargaining.

Limitations

Since the study is the first attempt at a significant move
toward quantification of the collective bargaining model by way of
a direct empirical test, there are a number of limitations which
must be considered.
1. From a mathematical point of view, the shape of the mathe
matical surface did not exactly portray the intended model for two
reasons:

(a) it would be a study in itself to develop the appropri

ate real-world coefficients for the model, and (b) it is most
probable that each bargaining interaction would require a different
set of coefficients because of both differences in the individual
participants as well as the nature of the bargaining situation."^
2. Raw data was developed from a role-playing bargaining
game using students; and, as good as role-playing games might be,
they are still artificial situations with artificial players which
may hamper the external validity.

^ E.C. Zeeman, et. al., "A Model for Institutional Distur
bances," o£. cit., pp. 387-402.

7

3. The nine interruptions needed to take measurements during
the role-playing exercise may have caused probe effects.

Unfortu

nately, it is not possible to predict in advance the nature of these
effects.

Attempts were made to block for this problem.
4. The sample size is small relative to the number of

possible points on the surface or even a reasonable subset of those
points.
size.

Both cost and time play a major role in limiting sample
Additionally, it is assumed that this was in part a pre

liminary study which, if succes-rul, will precipitate a number of
other more detailed studies.
5. The surface point may be incorrectly described, that is,
the ranges for strike, lockout, etc., may not be accurately assigned.
Here again, much more testing would be needed before a "perfect" set
of ranges could be developed.

Plan of Development

Chapter II presents an overview of some of the major types
of collective bargaining models.

No attempt is made to cover every

model, since the model being tested is morphologically different
from any of the bargaining models currently found in the literature.
Rather, the major structures are presented.

Part two of the chapter

gives a general overview of catastrophe theory and in particular,
the cusp model.
Chapter III deals with a description of the actual model as
an outgrowth of the Stagner and Rosen, Pigou-based, limits type

8

model.

The requirements for the cusp model are presented in terms

of the bargaining situation to show the model's appropriateness for
collective bargaining.
Chapter IV presents the methodology for testing the model.
Included are the mathematical manipulations needed to transform the
basic cusp into one more suitable for the experiment as well as the
basic description of the experiment itself.
Chapter V gives the results of the findings of the study.
Data provided by the questionnaire and the model, as well as the
analysis are presented.

Conclusions from the analysis of the data

as well as the implications of the study and suggestions for future
testing are provided.

9
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Chapter II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE RELEVANT TO THE STUDY

Collective Bargaining

Collective Bargaining Defined

In general, bargaining can be viewed as a form of bilateral
negotiations between entities.’*

From a systems standpoint, it is

an exchange process where the exchange is defined as the movement
of matter, energy, and/or information between (or among) systems.

2

Bargaining occurs when the systems involved in the exchange process
believe they can improve their current positions.

Consequently,

bargaining is possible if the systems perceive they can improve,
maintain, or lose less than if they did not bargain.

4

For the two

system case, which is the focus of this study, the possible outcomes
of any exchange process may be simplified to:

^S. LaTour, P. Houlden, L. Walker, and J. Thibout,
"Some
Determinants of Preference Modes of Conflict Resolution." Journal
of Conflict Resolution, 1976, Vol. 20, p. 320.
2

James G. Miller, Living Systems, McGraw-Hill Book Company,
New York, 1979.
3
Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology
of Bargaining, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London, 1977.
^Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, Aldine
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1968.

12

1. both systems gain
2. one system gains, the other stays the same
3. both systems stay the same
4. one gains the other loses
5. one stays the same, the other loses
6. both lose.
Some possible examples of the foregoing outcomes for twoperson situations might be as follows:
1. trade between individuals
2. teacher/student, relationship
3. mutual exchange of previously known information
4. master/slave
5. applicant turns down job offer
6. street fight.
While perceptions (and concomi tant

utilities) stir the

impetus for bargaining, five conditions are necessary to consumate
the actual process:
1. there are two or more parties with divergent interests,
2. the parties can communicate,
3. mutual compromise is possible,
4. provisional offers can be made, and
5. the provisional offers do

not fix the tangible outcome

until an offer is accepted by all sides.

^J.M. Chertkoff and J.K. Esser, "A Review of Experiments in
Explicit Bargaining,11 Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
1976, Vol. 12, p. 464.

13

From a managerial standpoint, one of the more important bar
gaining situations involves that occurring between employees and
employers regarding the work situation.

In particular, the bargaining

which occurs between management and labor unions (to include profes
sional organizations that bargain) over wages, hours, and working
conditions is among the more crucial types due to the complexity
of modern society and the ability to affect large segments of the
population by disruptions in the bargaining process.

The general

term for union/management bargaining is "collective bargaining."
Specifically:
1. The collective bargaining process can be thought of as
a complex network of events in the unionized organiza
tion ... that determines wages and fringe benefits,
hours, and working conditions and that introduce a
unique kind of transactional relationship between two
institutions.^
2. Collective bargaining is a continuous relationship
between a defined group of employees represented by a
union or association and an e m p l o y e r . ^
3. Collective bargaining ... involves representatives of
groups ... where, bargaining is defined simply as the
process of negotiating for agreement.^
4. Collective bargaining is a pure power relationship
between management and the union, in which conflict
exists over the control of functions in employment

6Wendall French, The Personnel Management Process: Human
Resources Administration, 3rd Edition, Houghton-Mifflin Company,
Boston, 1974, p. 55.
^William F. Glueck, Personnel: A Diagnostic Approach,
Business Publications, Inc., Dallas, Texas, 1974, p. 567.

g
Morley and Stephenson, o£. cit., pp. 26-27.

14

relations.
Both management and the union attempt,
through economic power, to retain the functions
under their jurisdiction at the time of the bargain
ing process.
Through power relationships, each party ^
attempts to encroach upon the other party's functions.
5.

Collective bargaining is:
A. a means of contracting for the sale of labor
B. a form of industrial government
C. a method of management.-^

If the essence of the above collective bargaining definitions
is extracted, one can simply view collective bargaining as the
bilateral negotiations between two groups.

Furthermore, collective

bargaining then becomes a special case of bargaining, in general, an
area where somewhat extended modelling has been attempted.

Bargaining Relations

The dynamics of the bargaining (from this point on, the terms
"bargaining" and "collective bargaining" will be used interchangeably)
systems depend on the nature of the relationship between the dyads,
just as the nature of the outcome of the exchange process depends on
the nature of the relationship between the two parties.

In a sense,

the relationship and outcome are one and the same as in the master/
slave situation.
Descriptions of the theoretical collective bargaining rela
tionship sets are shown in Figure 1 below:
9

C.
Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargain
ing: Principles and Practices, 2nd Edition, Houghton Mifflin Co.,
Boston, 1966, p. 9.
■^Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective Bargaining, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, New York, 1951, p. 121.

FIGURE 1
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP SETS
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C. Wilson Randle and Max S. Wortman, Jr., Collective Bargaining: Principles and
Practices, 2nd Edition, Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston, 1966, p. 29.
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Essentially, the scales are structurally isomorphic and the
differences represent semantic preferences rather than substantive
change.

Structure number three in the figure was used as an empiri

cal base by Derber, et. a l . , ^ to determine which relationship
prevailed in industry.

They found that out of 37 firms examined,

31 ol: the firms could be characterized as "Moderate Joint
Participation."

Additionally, the author found through a follow-up

study that over time:
Cl) union-management relationships were relatively stable
despite dynamic environments;
(2) frequent small changes occurred in the relationships,
due to various environmental factors; and
(3) the broad goals of the parties were relatively
stable, but the short-run goals were particularly
flexible.
What the foregoing suggests is that while relationships may
be generally stable, in any given period they may range over the
scale from overt hostility to complete cooperation.

This would be

particularly true in the time periods just before, through, and just
after negotiations.
It is also interesting that the most common relationship
found was participation and not conflict, since a number of models
11

R. Derber, e t . al., Human Organizations, (Winter 1962-63),
Vol. 21, pp. 242-270.
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of the bargaining process assume a conflict oriented situation.

12

The reason for this stems from the fact that the basic characteristics
of the conflict situation are similar to those of bargaining.

Con

sider the list of conditions for bargaining presented earlier and
those for conflict which are presented below:
(1) At least two parties (individuals or groups) are involved
in some kind of interaction.
(2) Mutually exclusive goals and/or mutually exclusive
values exist in fact, or as perceived by the parties
involved.
(3) Interaction is characterized by behavior designed to
defeat, reduce, or suppress the opponent or to gain
a mutually designated victory.
(4) The parties face each other with mutually opposing
actions and counter actions.
(5) Each party attempts to create an imbalance or rela- ^
tively favored position of power vis-a-vis the other.
It would appear that the basic difference between the two
lists is the more negative emphasis of the conflict conditions rela
tive to those of bargaining in general.

In fact, bargaining would

subsume conflict, since it allows for more alternatives, some of
which include those of the conflict situation.
12

See for example Daniel Druckman and Thomas Bonoma, "Deter
minants of Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation II'.
Opponents' Concession Rate and Similarity." Behavioral Science,
(1976), Vol. 21, pp. 252-262, and E. Allen Slusher, "Counterpart
Strategy, Prior Relations, and Constituent Pressure in a Bargaining
Simulation," Behavioral Science, (1978), Vol. 23, pp. 470-477.
13

Allan C. Filley, Interpersonal Conflict Resolution, Scott,
Foresman and Company, Glenview, Illinois, 1975, p. 4. For a detailed
discussion of goals in decision-making see Thomas A. Kochan, G.P.
Huber and L.L. Cummings, "Determinants of Intraorganizational Conflict
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From the preceding one can conclude that exchange, bargain
ing, collective bargaining, and conflict are closely intertwined
processes; and that due to the dynamic nature of each process, it is
often difficult to separate them into neat and distinct categories.
This becomes evident in the next section on models, as many authors
tend to use the terms somewhat interchangeably.

For the most part,

this is not a critical problem until generalizations are made, or
new theories are developed based on the models.

However, this

problem seems endemic to research and modelling and not just to
collective bargaining.

Models in Bargaining

There is no easy way to classify bargaining models.

The dif

ficulty comes, in part, from the fact that true analysis of the
bargaining phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary (systems) approach
to which there has been some resistance to date, involving as a
minimum, psychology and economics.

14

Furthermore, when models are

developed, they may come from a variety of areas, both basic and
hybrid, such that they are focusing on different aspects of the
bargaining process and are, therefore, not easily integrated.

in Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector," Administrative
Science Quarterly, (March 1975), Vol. 20, pp. 10-20.
14

Sidney Siegel and Lawrence E. Fouracker, Bargaining and
Decision Making:
Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly, McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc., New York, 1969, p. 5.
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Fouracker and Siegel imply that a quantitative analysis may bring
the modellers together.
As a general statement, the current models can be divided
into prescriptive and descriptive models.

The prescriptive models

for the most part are mathematical, while the descriptive models
tend to be verbal.

This being the case, the terms mathematical

and verbal will be used as the major categories for the purposes
of this paper.

It is recognized that there is a continuum along

which models actually fall, and that this categorization may force
a certain model into a classification which only barely describes
its

nature. If this has been done it is inorder to help emphasize

the relevance and importance of the model being evaluated in this
research.

Figure 2 below gives an overview of the general classi

fication of types of bargaining models.
Notice that in the model hierarchy, mathematical models
have more echelons than the verbal models.

This occurs for pri

marily three reasons:
(1) Mathematical models can be pushed further and refined
by increasing the number of relationships, variables,
types of analysis, and reducing semantic r>ciuivocation.
(2)

The economic base, particularly wage determinants
and utility theory, has spurred more interest in these
types of models.

15Ibid. , p. 5.

FIGURE 2
BARGAINING MODEL TYPOLOGY
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(3) Verbal models cannot easily be subjected to increased
resolution.

In fact, the increased resolution usually

requires a new language (generally mathematics).
In this section which follows, a representative of each of
the major types of model listed will be reviewed.

The intent is to

give the reader an overview of model types rather than a definitive
listing of all bargaining models.

Mathematical Models

Economic Models - Utility
As stated earlier, one of the major disciplines which supplies
input to bargaining models is that of economics.

Obviously, this is

a result of the wage setting aspect of the bargaining process.

16

Furthermore, because of economics' quantitative roots which are
based on utility theory, many of the mathematical models of bargain
ing behavior are utility theoretic oriented.
In its most simple and general form this situation may be
represented as follows in Figure 3, where the gain in utilities
of bargainers one and two are represented by x and y respectively,
and the solution (negotiation) set is represented by the arc.
specific solution is represented by the point (x^, y^).
16

A

That is,

John C. Anderson, "Determinants of Bargaining Outcome in
the Federal Government of Canada," Industrial and Labor Relations
Review, January 1979, Vol. 32, No. 2, pp. 224-241.
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it is assumed that the bargainers will try to maximize their
.
17
respective utilities.

FIGURE 3
THE ELEMENTARY BARGAINING PROBLEM

Y

.( x ,y ;

x = Utility of Bargainer 1
y = Utility of Bargainer 2
arc = Negotiation set
(x,y)= A Solution
Source:

Paul Swingle, The Structure of Conflict, Academic Press,
New York, 1970, p. 10.

17

Paul Swingle, The Structure of Conflict, Academic Press,
New York, 1970, p. 10.
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Leap states it somewhat more formally using a slightly different notation set: 18
(1) A pair of variables, x ^ , x ^ represent demands of two
bargainers at any point in time.
(2) A pair of utility functions U^(x^) and U (x ) exist.
2

2

It is assumed that the utility functions are increasing
such that "more of something" is always better and has
a higher level of utility.

Therefore, Uj(x^) > 0 and

U^(x2) > 0.
(3) A fixed amount m exists such that disagreement between
them occurs if x ^+x2 > m ’ ‘'
In Leap's analysis, three models which make explicit use of
utilities are examined in detail.
Zeuthen, and Pen.

19

They are models by Edgeworth,

Since the basic morphogenesis of the models is

the same, i.e., utilities, the paper will only briefly review two
utility oriented models; a) Zeuthen-Harsanyi, based on the risk pro
blem applied to the maximization of expected utilities; and b) Nash,
which has a game theoretic b a s e . ^
18

Terry Leap, "An Analysis of Bargaining Theories Which Make
Explicit Use of Economic Utility Functions," Unpublished paper, p. 3.
19
20

Ibid., pp. 5-9.

George deMenil, Bargaining: Monopoly Power versus Union
Power, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 15-20.
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Zeuthen-Harsanyi Model - Essentially this approach assumes that the
participants will continue to evaluate the alternatives of accepting
the opponent's offer.

He may, however, hold out for his current

demand where the risk is that of incurring a stalemate which has no
utility for the bargainer.

21

Let 1 and 2 represent the bargainers such that their utility
of an outcome is to each U(l) and U(2) respectively.

If 1 opens with

an offer that would result in 11(11) and U(21) for he and 2, while 2
opens with U(22) and U (12) for he and 1, the situation may be por
trayed as shown in Figure 4 below.

FIGURE 4
ZEUTHEN-HARSANYI MODEL

u

Source:

George deMenil, Bargaining: Monopoly Power Versus Union
Power, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971, p. 16.

^^Ibid . , p . 15.
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If 2 accepts the offer from 1, he gets U (12); while if he
holds out, he risks the probability of a stalemate, P, and his
expected utility becomes (1-P) U(22).

The model assumes that 2's

willingness to resist is a function of the risk he is willing to
endure in order to get his demand.

That is, he will resist as long

as

(1-P) U(22) ^ U (12)

and

(1-P) 11(22) = U (12)

or

the limit will be

P

U (22)

U (12)

U (22)

The Zeuthen-Harsanyi's conclusion is that the party with
the lowest tolerance for risk will reduce his demand and that the
12

limit is the point where U U

is a maximum.

22

It should be pointed

out that Leap's presentation is somewhat more correct as he includes
the probability of a stalemate and talks in terms of each person's
propensity for risk.

23

(l-rp Uu

+ r1U 1 * U12

(l-r 2 ) U 22 + r 2ii2 * D 21

22

23

Ibid., p. 15.
Leap, o£. cit., p. 6,
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Nash Model - With the work of Von Neumann and Morgenstern, game
theory, utility theory, and economics are joined.

24

Game theory

relates to bargaining behavior in that it is a theory of rational
decision-making in conflict situations, which may be defined by:
(1)

aset

of decision makers called players,

(2)

aset

of strategies available to each player,

(3)

aset
of outcomes, each of which is a result of
particular choices of strategies made by the
players on a given play of the game, and

(4) a set of payoffs accorded to each player in each
of the possible outcomes.25
What Nash did was to look at the game theoretic structure
and conclude that it involved four axioms which he proved would
yield a single solution point.
(1) Efficiency:
frontier.

26

Nash's four axioms are:

The solution must lie on the utility

(2) Symmetry: If the utility increment frontier is
symmetrical, the solution gives equal utility
increments to both parties.
(3) Transformat ion Invariances: The solution is not
altered by a linear, order-preserving transforma
tion of the utility function of either party.
24

John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games
and Economic Behavior, Princeton Press, Princeton, N.J., 1944.
25

Rapoport, c>£. cit., p. 1. See also John C. Harsanyi,
Rational Behavior and Bargaining Equilibrium in Games and Social
Situations, Cambridge University Press, London, 1977.
26
George deMenil, op. cit.., p. 9.
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(4) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: Suppose the
solution for a given utility frontier has been found.
If that utility frontier is favorably altered anywhere
except at the solution point, the solution is not
changed.
Because of the complexity of the model, only its basic
equations

are presentedto give the reader a feel for the

of itsbasic structure.

What follows has been

nature

taken from deMenil's

i 27
work.
Assumptions:

(1) the employer produced a product x whose demand curve
is given by P = P(x; p, I) where P

= price, p =

general price index, I = aggregate income.
(2) the long-run production function is given by
x = x (E,

K; t) Xtfhich is twice differentiable and

convex, E = number of workers, K = capital stock.
(3) all employees belong to one union, which gets numbers
from an infinitely elastic supply at the going wage
rate from nonunion industries.

The going wage rate =

Q

W .

W = union wage rate.

(4) Employers' utility is a function of monopoly profits
ir = PX - WE - RK (where R is the rental on capital stock)
such that U

e

= a

o

+ a, n.
1

(5) Union's utility function is a result of the differences
between real wage bill (b) and what real wages would

27Ibid., p. 21-27.
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be if its members earned nonunion wages; when B is
the difference and UU = b^ + b^ fU (B);

WE - WaE

(6) B is the real wage surplus.

Model:
From the assumptions one gets:
(1) The union wants to maximize B, while the employer wants
to maximize

tt

(2) The joint result is that of maximizing the sum of the
two functions or

PX - W3E - RK and E and K

are determined by taking first partials with respect to x.

R = (P = 9P x) 9X

V

9X

BK

(3) Through appropriate substitution the following result
occurs,

WE - WaE

tt

tt

tt°

(3fU/9B)B
fu (B)-f U (B°)
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which determines the distribution of income between
employer and union and is the prime motivation for
developing this model.
The model itself is static and looks at the bilateral mono
poly situation.

Two conclusions which may be drawn from the model

are:
(1) Collective bargaining is more than just a question of
wages and working conditions and
(2) The veto power of unions via strike action brings into
question the entire theory of the firm.

28

Comments on Utility Models
As stated earlier, the intent of the preceding is to expose
the reader to the type of models available in a specific category.
These are prototypical of the class of models they represent.
utility based models may be found by Bishop,

29

Raiffa,

30

Hicks,

Other
31

28

Ibid., p. 27. Heckathorn, Douglas, "A Paradigm for Bar
gaining and a Test of Two Bargaining Models," Behavioral Science
(March 1978), Vol. 23, No. 2, gives an interesting discourse and test
of the Smorordinsky-Kalai model in contrast to the more popular Nash
model.
See also Daniel Druckman and Thomas Bonoma, "Determinants of
Bargaining Behavior in a Bilateral Monopoly Situation II: Opponent's
Concession Rate and Similarity," Behavioral Science, (1976), Vol. 21,
pp. 252-262, for more extensive empirical testing.
29

Robert L. Bishop, "A Zeuthen-Hicks Theory of Bargaining,"
Econometrica, Vol. 32, (July 1964), p. 410-417.
30

Howard Raiffa, "Arbitration Schemes for Generalized TwoPerson Games," in H.W. Kuhn and A.W. Tucker (eds.), Contributions
to the Theory of Games, II, Princeton Univ. Press, Princeton, 1953.
31

Johri R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 2nd ed., MacMillan
Company, London, 1963.

30

Pen,"^ Edgeworth,^ Foldes,^4 Rapoport,^ and Von N e u m a n n , t o name
a few.

Unfortunately as Leap summarizes in his paper, several key

points must be kept in mind when using utility based models.

37

(1) Individuals may have utility functions if they meet
the conditions listed in footnote.38
it is highly
unlikely that a group utility function exists which
meets these conditions.
Hence, anything purported
to be a group utility function is likely to be discon
tinuous and not amenable to the mathematical manipulations
(especially where the calculus is involved) of the
bargaining theories cited in this paper.
(2)

Measurement problems will make itdifficult to assess
an individuals' utility function in many instances.
This is most true when noneconomic issues are involved.

(3) Utility functions may change over time. This must be
incorporated into the dynamic theories of the bargaining
process if they are to remain viable.
It would also
appear that a concession on one item (for example, an
additional holiday) would alter the utility of another
item (for example, wages).
32

Jan Pen, "A General Theory of Bargaining," American Economic
Review, (March 1952), Vol. 42, pp. 24-42.
33

Alan Coddington, Theories of the Bargaining Process, Aldine
Publishing Company, Chicago, 1968,
34

n
Lucien Foldes, "A Determinate Model of Bilateral Monopoly,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August 1947), Vol. 61, pp. 503-532.
35
36
37
38

Rapoport, ojp. cit., p. 2.

Von Neumann and Morgenstern, op. cit.
Leap, op cit., p. 15.

Ibid., p. 13. Leap lists certain conditions which must be
satisfied by individual preferences in order for these preferences
to be representable by a utility function.
(1) An individual's pre
ferences must be completely ordered and transitive; (2) the individual
must be aware of all alternatives available to him; (3) the individu
al's preferences must be continuous such that no "gaps" exist in
his field of choice.

31

(4) A bargaining theory must make clear as to what type of
utility function it is incorporating. There are two
types of utility functions: cardinal and ordinal.
The cardinal utility function stipulates that if one
item has a utility value of 5 while the second item,
has a utility value of 10, then the second item is
twice as preferred as the first. The ordinal utility
function assigns utility numbers to items, but there
are no weights given to the utility numbers.
An
example of an ordinal ranking would be the case of
the football polls which rank college teams.
In addition to Leap's cautions, there is the problem that
the models themselves do not accurately mirror reality.

39

’

40

Nash's

model will never produce a strike if the proponents act rationally.
However, strikes exist and one cannot always conclude union or manage
ment acted rationally.

Furthermore, the quantitative models tend to

be static focusing primarily on the wage related issues.

Bargaining

itself is a process over which a number of items not directly related
to wages are considered.

Economic Models - Other
An example of a non-utility theory model

(it might be argued

that all economic models are at least implicitly utility based) is one
developed by Farber.
39

41

The basic model examines its present value

Ibid., p. 20.

40

Sidney Siegel, Alberta E. Siegel and Julia M. Andrews,
Choice, Strategy, and Utility, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
1964, pp. 165-167.
^ H e n r y S. Farber, "Bargaining Theory, Wage Outcomes, and
the Occurrence of Strikes: An Econometric Analysis," American
Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 262-271.
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in terms of the trade-off between the demanded wage increases and
the length of a strike.

The shape of this trade-off is determined by a "concession
schedule" which denotes the minimum wage increase acceptable
to the union rank and file after a strike of a given length.
This schedule has a negative slope, reflecting the rate at
which the rank and file reduce their expectations of a wage
increase in response to hardships imposed on them by a strike
and to "new" information learned from a strike about the
degree of employer resistance to union wage demands.
In
simple terms, they become willing to settle for less as the
strike progresses. The role of the union leadership is to
convey to the management the shape of the concession schedule
as well as to provide information to the rank and file regard
ing feasible wage d e m a n d s . ^2
[see Figure 5]

FIGURE 5
CONCESSION SCHEDULE

Source:

Henry S. Farber, "Bargaining Theory, Wage Outcomes, and
the Occurrence of Strikes: An Econometric Analysis,"
American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 262-271.

42Ibid., p. 262.
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Other Mathematical Models
England

43

presents a model of two-party negotiations using

Markov chain analysis.

Essentially the model is based on

.... the assumption that the pressures acting on a negotia
tor differ for each input-mental state combination and that
the pressures from any combination are constant over time; the
negotiator is influenced only by the most recent input and by
his mental state at the time of input. When earlier offers are
recalled at all. they do not affect the negotiator's behavior
significantly.

The major behavioral implication is that the negotiator acts
as a "probabalistic automaton" which may explain some portion of
behavior, but seems, excessively restrictive in the total view of
the negotiator's behavior.

Comments on Mathematical Models
As a general statement the major problem with most of the
mathematical models is their restrictive assumptions.

45

While

mathematics quite regularly affords one the ability to simply
describe complex situations and test those descriptions without
damaging the real world system, it is not without its limitations.
Epistemologically, mathematics is a language, and one's ability to
develop extensive models is a function of the language itself.

Thus

43

J. Lynn England, "Mathematical Models of Two-Party Nego
tiations," Behavioral Science, (1973), Vol. 18, pp. 189-197.
44

Ibid., p. 190.

^ W . Buckley, T. Burns, and L.D. Meeker, "Structural Resolu
tions of Collective Action Problems," Behavioral Science, Vol. 19,
(1974), pp. 296.
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each branch of mathematics has fundamental limits beyond which no
increase in its number of variables will increase the knowledge
gained.

Furthermore, mathematics as a language has limits beyond

which we cannot go (Godels' Theorem).

This is not to say that

researchers are even close to the limits, but rather that other
forms of construals may be needed.

Or perhaps, the union of several

languages is needed.

Verbal Bargaining Models
In direct contrast to the foregoing, verbal models attempt
to cover the entire spectrum of the bargaining process.

The verbal

models have been divided into five general types; a) Process, b)
Stages, c) Forces, d) Limits and e) All Others.

46

Unlike their

mathematical counterparts they do not yield deterministic results,
except where they include a mathematical model of say wage settle
ment in their description.

Process Models

Walton and McKersie Model - Walton and McKersie have developed what
might be called the most comprehensive overall descriptive model of
46

This typology developed through discussions with Dr.
Terence A. Oliva.
47

Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral
Theory of Labor Negotiations, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York ,
1965. Peterson and Tracy use empirical evidence in attempting to
integrate the subprocesses, Richard Peterson and Lane Tracy,
"Testing a Behavioral Theory Model of Labor Negotiations," Industrial
Relations, Vol. 16, No. 1, (February 1977), pp. 35-50. For an
empirical study of subprocess four, see Charles Odewahn and Joseph
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the bargaining process.

In some ways it may be viewed as four

distinct models (subprocesses) which focus on different aspects of
the bargaining situation.
(1) Distributive bargaining - deals with the conflicts
arising over the allocation of scarce resources.

Specifically,

union-management differences over wages, hours, working conditions
and the like.
(2) Integrative bargaining - deals with joint problem solving.
This may result in both sides being able to divide a larger portion
of the added rewards.

Unlike conflict-oriented behavior, integrative

bargaining may require a concessionary attitude.
(3) Attitudinal Structuring model - deals with the structure
of the attitudes of the bargaining parties.

This results from the

fact that human beings are an integral part of the bargaining process.
Thus, psychological tactics and sociological ideologies become a
major component in labor negotiations.
(4) Intraorganizational bargaining - deals with the internal
conflict of each of the bargaining parties.

Normally, neither

management nor unions have an internal consensus.

Ideas on what

should be done, or what strategy should be used in the negotiations
regularly differ.
What makes the Walton and McKersie model effective in
describing the overall bargaining process is that each subprocess

Krislon, "Contrast Rejections: Testing the Explanatory Hypotheses,"
Industrial Relations, (October 1973), Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 292-3.
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model is itself a full scale model.

The distribution model, for

example, includes game theory, utility functions, the wage spectrum,
and subjectively expected utilities as well as a detailed section on
strategies and tactics of the model.
Other subprocess models integrate frameworks such as balance
theory, reinforcement theory, and role-conflict resolution.

In

many ways, Walton and McKersie have the essence of a complete bar
gaining model.

That is, the overlap of the four subprocesses forms

the entire model, much in the same way that intersecting sets do
in a Venn diagram.

Unfortunately, the subprocesses do not fit

together as well as they might, and only the distributive bargaining
portion yields the advantages found in quantitative analysis.
Furthermore, it is difficult to "operate" the model.

It is

functionally weak in an operational sense, since one cannot use it
directly in the real w o r l d . ^

Stages Models
Stages models may be viewed as a kind of process model where
the process is sequential.
intertwined and interactive.

Walton and McKersie's subprocesses are
The models which follow are strictly

sequential.

Peterson and Tracy, og_. cit. , pp. 35-50.
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The AMA Basic Process Model

Structure ~

1. Advance Preparation
a. Advance Notice of Contract Termination
b. Management Review
c. Contract Language
d. Retaining Control of Managements' Function
(1) positive approach
(2) negative approach
e. Defining Managements' Rights
f. Clauses Curtailing Managements' Freedom to Operate
(1) union shop
(2) management rights clause
(3) seniority
(4) no-strike, no-lockout provisions
(5) eligibility requirements
(6) arbitration
(7) overtime
(8) pyramiding costs
(9) contract opening
g. Undesirable Provisions
(1) hot cargo or struck work clauses
(2) picket line clauses
(3) mutual-consent clauses
(4) guaranteed-wage or hours clause
(5) automatic-wage progressions beyond base rate
(6) policing of the agreement by the union
(7) all-inclusive benefits (catch-all) clauses
2. Facts Required for Bargaining
a. Company Policies
b. Internal Company Data
c. Statistical Review
d. External Data
e. Background Information
3. Contract Termination Notice
a. Notice to Terminate or Modify (Taft-Hartley Act)
b. Company Initial Notice
c. When Notice is not Timely
4. Reviewing the Union Proposals
a. An Initial contract
b. Contract Termination or Modification
49

Elizabeth Martinez, Understanding Collective Bargaining,
American Management Association, Inc., New York, 1958, pp. 97-109.
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5. Company Proposals
6. Final Preparation
a. Necessary Materials
(1) negotiations notebook
(2) spread sheet

The Douglas Stages Model‘S 1. The first stage (establishing the negotiating range)
consists of a 'thorough and exhaustive determination'
if the range within which the parties will have to do
business with each other.
2. In the second stage (reconnoitering the negotiating
range) negotiations attempt to 'convey without com
mitment.
[That is,] negotiators research earnestly
in the background for signs of tacit agreement, long
before in their public exchange they can afford to
profess anything but continued strong disagreement.’
3. In the third and final stage (precipating the decision
making crisis) a decision-making crisis is reached,
in which negotiators must consult with their respective
parties, and, if possible, conclude an agreement.
The Douglas model is essentially homomorphic to the AMA model
or for that matter, any of the sequential procedures oriented repre
sentations of the bargaining process.

Such time frame models are

linear and tend to miss the nonsequential aspects of the process such
as are accounted for by a Walton and McKersie type model.

Interactive Forces Model

Interactive forces model are similar to the process models
in that they overlap in time.

They are unlike process models in

that they are usually made up of univariate force units.

Morley and Stephenson, ojd. cit., p. 38.
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The Weber Model
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- Weber views bargaining as a set of four inter

active elements shown below:
1. Size (number

of members) of the bargaining unit

2. Scope (extent as to number of issues and levels of
workforce involved)
3. Distribution of decision-making power
4. Relationships between bargaining units
The interaction of the forces developed from these elements
form the basic bargaining structure.

As the elements vary along

their respective continuum the structure changes.

If one arbitrarily

chooses scales for the above elements, then it is easier to con
ceptualize the process (see Table I) .

TABLE I
POSSIBLE DIMENSIONS OF BARGAINING ELEMENTS

1

Size

2

Scope

3

Decision-Making

4

Relat ionship

small <-------------

> large

limited c-------------

> extended

none c-------------

> absolute

conf1ict c------------- — > cooperation

As one selects different combinations from the scales, dif
ferent bargaining structures emerge.

^^Weber, oj). cit., pp. 18-19.

For example compare:
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Situation 1

vs.

Situation 2

1. Small

Large

2. Limited

Extended

3. Absolute

Equal

4. Conflict

Cooperation

Obviously, the bargaining process would vary considerably in the
two different situations.

The model, thus, does seem to have some

face validity.

McGrath's Tripolar Model
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- McGrath's model examines three forces

which affect the opposing leaders of the two bargaining parties:
(1) R-forces - focus on the given position the negotiator
has relative to his group, and include his
attitudinal identification and representative
obligations.
(2) A-forces - focus on the negotiator's view of the opposing
party's position.
(3) C-forces - focus on the situation of the larger organiza
tion in which the parties exist.
Negotiation

is a function of the interplay of the forces,

just as in the preceding model.

Unlike the previous model, however,

Morley and Stephenson, op.cit., p. 28. E. Allen Slusher
"Counterpart Strategy, Prior Relations, and Constituent Pressure in
a Bargaining Simulation," Behavioral Science, (1978), Vol. 23, pp.
470-477, attempts to empirically test "counterpart strategy" and
"constituent pressure" which are quite similar to A-forces and
R-forces respectively.
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the tripolar model is primarily psychologically based and focuses
on the individuals more than the structure of the situation.

Limits Models
Limits models generally are based on Pigou's range of inde53
terminateness.

Essentially this model implies that wages will not

necessarily meet the theoretic economic optimum; but, rather, will
fall within some range, such that management's maximum offer is
greater than the union's minimum acceptable level.
overlap, the greater the area of bargaining.

The larger the

If no overlap occurs,

there is no opportunity for bargaining to occur and conflict is
inevitable.

Obviously, both bargaining skill and bargaining

strength determine where final settlement points will be.
of this conceptualization appear in many other models.

Variants
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A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, Second Edition,
MacMillan and Company Ltc., London, 1924.
54

R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union Management
Relations, Belmont, California, Wadsworth, Inc., 1965, pp. 90-96.
Similar description of bargaining behavior as a function of behavioral
variables may be found in S.H. Slichter, J.J. Healy, and E.R. Livernash, The Impact of Collective Bargaining on Management, Washington,
D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1960; R.E. Walton and R.B. McKersie,
o p . cit.; Randle and Wortman, o p . cit., H.M. Levinson, Determining
Forces in Collective Bargaining, New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1966; L.C. Megginson and C.R. Gullet, "A Predictive Model of UnionManagement Conflict," Personnel Journal (June 1970); J.B. Miner, Personnel and Industrial Relations: A Managerial Approach, New York,
MacMillan and Co., Ltd., 1973; F.H. Cassel and J.J. Baron, Collective
Bargaining in the Public Sector, Columbus, Grid Inc., 1975; S.W.
Gillerman, Managers and Subordinates, Hinsdale, Illinois, the Dryden
Press, 1976; and L.C. Megginson, Personnel and Human Resources Admini
stration, Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1977, T.A.
Kochan and H.N. Wheeler, "Municipal Collective Bargaining: A Model
and Analysis of Bargaining Outcomes," Industrial and Labor Relations

42

Randle/Wortman's Graphic Interpretation of Pigou's Model

For the model below (see Figure 6) there are five different
issues.
In Issue I, the bargaining limits of both labor and
management are identical. The parties are therefore in
virtual agreement at the beginning.
Settlement can be made
anywhere between the two limits OF' and F O ’. More specifically,
suppose that labor expects to make an original demand for a
40 cents
an hour increase, but will settle for no less than
10 cents
an hour. Under these conditions O' = 40 cents and
F' = 10 cents.
On the other hand, management originally
expects to offer 10 cents an hour, but will not go beyond
40 cents
an hour. Then 0 = 10 cents and F = 40 cents an
hour. Then 0 = 10 cents and F = 40 cents. Agreement will
thus be consummated for a wage increase somewhere between
10 cents and 40 cents an hour. The relative bargaining
strengths will determine the exact amount.
If management
has the greatest bargaining persuasiveness and economic
power, the agreement will be closer to 10 cents. If
labor is stronger in negotiations, the agreement will be
closer to 40 cents.
This example may be followed through for the other
issues.
In Issue II, agreement will still be easy, for
the area of agreement (F'F) is large. There now appears
two areas, however, in which no agreement is possible
because they are beyond the overlapping bargaining limits
of the parties.
These are OF' and FO'. Generally as
F'F shrinks and OF' and F O ' grow larger, agreement becomes
more and more difficult.
In Issue III, the area of agree
ment is much smaller and agreement will be more difficult,
coming only after lengthy sessions and much negotiation.
In Issue IV, the outer bargaining limits of labor and manage
ment coincide.
The only possible area of agreement is the
line FF'.
In terms of the first example, labor will take no
less than 40 cents an hour and management will offer no more
than 40 cents.
To reach agreement will be exceedingly dif
ficult. Perhaps it will come only after long hours of
proposal and counter-proposal and threats of direct economic
sanction. Mediation may be employed.
If the parties per
severe, however, settlement will finally be made at 40

Review, (October 1975), Vol. 20; and P.F. Gerhart, "Determinants
of Bargaining Outcomes in Local Government Labor Negotiations,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (April 1976), Vol. 29.
■^Randle and Wortman, oj>. cit., pp. 188-190.

FIGURE 6
G R A P H I C R E P R E S E N T A T I O N OF FIV E ISSUES IN TERMS OF IN C R E A S I N G
D I F F I C U L T Y OF A G R E E M E N T

OF'

FO'
Mgt.

ISSUE I
Labor

0

F’

F

O'

Mgt.
ISSUE II

Labor

F'

O'

F

Mgt.
ISSUE III
Labor

0’

FF'
Mgt.
ISSUE IV
Labor

0

F
Mgt.

F'

B

ISSUE V
L abor

LEGEND
0 =
F =
OF =

original m a n a g e m e n t p o s i t i o n
final ma n a g e m e n t p o s i t i o n
b a r g a i n i n g limits of m a n a g e m e n t
□

Source:

R a n d l e and Wortman,

O' = o r i g i n a l labor p o s i t i o n
F' ■= final labor p o s i t i o n
O'F' = b a r g a i n i n g limits of labo

= area of b a r g a i n i n g agre e m e n t

oja. c i t . , p. 189.
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cents per hour.
In Issue V, the bargaining limits of labor
and management do not overlap. This means that under normal
bargaining a deadlock will ensue.

Stagner and Rosen~^ - Stagner and Rosen developed a model based on
Pigou's formulation.
Both parties bring certain expectations to the negotia
tions.
It is general practice for each group to write its
own expectations into proposals for the new contract...
Similarly, each side is likely to have, at the beginning
of negotiations, an idea of the limit beyond which it will
make no concessions.
This limit results in a bargaining
zone for each side, with the preferred solution on one end
and the tolerance limit on the other... As the parties
bargain, they explore these limits and, hopefully, find an
area in which a compromise is possible. For both sides,
the-e is a bargaining zone between the employer’s tolerance
limit and the union's tolerance limit... Each side can
always find some instances to support the "wished for"
solution; and each side will tend to ignore the evidence
presented by the opposition.
Nevertheless, communication
does take place; each takes cognizance of the data, and the
acceptability shifts. Management moves up a little, and
the union moves down a little, until an acceptable point
for both is reached. ^

The above can be diagrammed as shown in Figure 7.

An implication is

that when one or the other party's tolerance limits are exceeded,
a strike or lockout will occur.

In addition, neither party is

aware of the opposing party's tolerance limits or desired solution.

"’^ S t a g n e r

ancj Rosen, op. cit., pp. 90-96.

^Ibid ., p . 93.
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FIGURE 7
STAGNER-ROSEN MODEL FOR BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

Union’s
Desired
Solution

Union's -Expectation

Employer's
Tolerance
Limit
Employer's
Expectation

Bargaining

Union's
Tolerance —
Limit
Employer's
Desired
Solution

Source:

Adapted from R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union
Management Relations, Wadsworth, Inc., Belmont, Calif.,
1965, pp. 90-96.

Comments on the Theoretical Models
No attempt has been made to examine all the theoretically
based models of collective bargaining.

Rather, the attempt was to

look at examples of the major types as they are essentially iso
morphic within a class.

Looking at the models discussed above, one

can represent them for structural analysis as follows:

FIGURE 8
STRUCTURAL A N A LYSIS OF T H E O R E T I C A L B A R G A I N I N G MODE L S

Utility

Limi t s

■P'
O'

47

The structural breakdown allows one to examine a model's
characteristics apart from its basic language.

Notice that in this

form it is easier to remember that the models are simply construals
of the various systems they represent which is, in this case, the
bargaining process.

From the generic diagram the essential logic

structure of the construct is evident, as well as the other types
of languages which might be used with the various models.
For example, the process model suggests a Venn diagram type of
analysis may be of aid.

Similarly, the forces model implies that

vector analysis could be appropriate.
gest possible model gaps.

5

8

Furthermore, the models sug

Take as an example the model which is being

tested in this dissertation; it would be represented simply in two
space as:
FIGURE 9
CATASTROPHE BASED MODEL

From a mathematical view these models may be all described
in set theoretic terms. However, this may result in too much
abstraction.
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or more accurately as three, two-space sets as shown in Figure 10
(a), (b) and (c).

FIGURE 10
QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE CUSP MODEL

The point is that one can see immediately that the nature of
the proposed model is structurally different from any of the others
proposed.
nized.

Consequently, a substantial departure is easily recog

Furthermore, it should be more apparent at this point as to

why interest was focused on major model types rather than a defini
tive listing of all models.
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Empirical Validation of Models
Various attempts have been made to test the aforementioned
. . i
59 ,
models empirically.
■ 1 1

60 ,

61,

62 ,

63,

64,

65

T
,
,
It can be argued

that empirical designs in themselves are models of bargaining
behavior.

However, as far as this study is concerned, they will

simply be treated as experimental designs used to test a given
theoretical model.

The rationale for this is that if one uses

the scientific method, one cannot divorce the theoretical from
the empirical and have any hope of generating a meaningful and
useable model.
Since direct data gathered from management and union nego
tiations is at most limited to the results or outcomes of the
bargaining session, most researchers have been forced to move to
game oriented laboratory experiments to develop data.

While no

agreed upon set of terminology exists for the game typology, the one
by Morley and Stephenson will be used.^^
59
60

Fouracker and Siegel, op>. cit.

Raiffa,

op.

cit.

Gin
Rapoport, ojp. cit.

62
Morley and Stephenson, o£. cit.

63

Levinson,

64

0

£. cit.

Seigel, Siegel and Andrews, oji. cit.

^ F o r a brief discussion of the problems and lack of testing
see Heckathorn, o£. cit
66.
Morley and Stephenson, op_. cit.
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Experimental Bargaining Models :
(1) Matrix Games
(2) Distribution Games
(3) Economic Exchange Games
(4) Role-playing Games
(5) Substitute Debate Games
Matrix games are of the form shown in the figure below:

FIGURE 11
MATRIX GAME

B

A

1

A

2

1

V

where player A's strategies are
respective payoffs are P., P .
A

D

B

2

PB

and

B's are B^, B^, and their

Games represent the tradeoff/conflict

situation quite well and consequently are appropriate in tradeoff
type models such as those that are utility based.
to Morley and Stephenson:

However, according

"abstract games of this sort (whether

matrix games or mechanical games) do not simulate bargaining situa•
ii
. .
!I 7
tions at all, even very simple ones.
8

67

Ibid., p. 48.

See also Allen E. Slusher, oj>. cit., p. 471.
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Distribution games do include a negotiation process.

Gener

ally the task is to meet some minimal goal, say a number of points
or amount of money.

Usually, each party is unaware of

his opponent's

goals and can get more points or money if he gets more than his
minimum.

The major problem is the tendency for such games to exert

excessive time pressure and severely restrict all communication.
Economic games use sets of profits tables for each side such
that they are to agree on a price/quantity exchange.

Usually some

of the outcomes maximize the joint gains available (i.e., Pareto
Optimal) while others do not.
bution

In a sense economic games and distri

games are similar in nature with the exception that the

economic games are more realistic.
Role playing games are realistic simulations which require
the participants to accomplish a set of collective bargaining tasks
that mirrors those found in the real world.

68

The problem has

become one of measurement and the role identification of the
participants.
Substitute debate games employ real negotiators with bona
fide issues of interest to both parties in a laboratory setting with
discussion oriented tasks.

As might be suspected, it is difficult

to get a sufficient number of negotiators and issues to conduct
the experiments with any reasonable amount of replication.
of such studies are referenced below.

68Ibid., p. 52.

Examples
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Study

Type
1. Matrix

Swingle 1970

2. Distribution Games

Fisher 1970

3. Economic Games

Siegel and Fouracker 1960

4. Role Playing

Campbell 1960

5. Substitute Debate Games

McGrath and Julian 1963

Morley and Stephenson have made a comparison of the various type of
experimental models which examine their essential features.

(see

Table 2)
Notice that there is an implicit ranking of the appropriate
ness of the experimental games as one moves to the right in the
table from matrix to substitute games.

Of particular interest is

that next to using real negotiators, role-playing games are the
best.

This fact has direct bearing on the test of the model in this

study.

Catastrophe Theory:

Rene Thom

69

An Overview

developed a new mathematical modelling technique

known as catastrophe theory.

The underlying mathematics of the

theory is differential topology and requires a somewhat extensive
background in mathematics.
69

Fortunately, the dynamicism of the

Rene Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, New York,
W.A. Benjamin, Inc., 1975.

TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF EXPERIMENTAL MODELS

Essential Features
1. Type of simulation
2. Communication possibilities
3. Amount of information about
other profits
4. Sequence of choice
5. Identification of different
bargaining situations

Source:

Matrix Game
Abstract
Extremely restricted

Complete
Simultaneous
According to Charac
teristics of payoff
matrix

Distribution Game
Abstract

Game of
Economic Exchange

Role-Playing
Debate

Realistic

Realistic

Substitute
Debate
Realistic
Unrestricted

Restricted

Restricted

Typically
Incomplete

Typically
Incomplete

Typically
Incomplete

Typically
Incomplete

Sequential

Sequent ial

Sequential

Sequent ial

According to Charac
teristics of profit
matrix

According to Charac
teristics of profit
tables and
’scenario'

Unrestricted

According to Charac
teristics of profit
tables and
'scenario'

Ian Morley and Geoffrey Stephenson, The Social Psychology of Bargaining, George Allen & Unvin, Ltd., London,

197/, p. 45.

According to Charateristics of profit
tables and
'scenario'
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resulting model (catastrophe surface) can be fairly easily understood
without referring to topology, primarily due to the work of Zeeman,
who has popularized the theory with his now famous, though somewhat
controversial Scientific American^

article.

More recently, most of

Zeeman's work has been collected in a work titled Catastrophe
Theory:

Selected Papers 1972-1977

71

and the entire September, 1978

issue of Behavioral Science was devoted to catastrophe theory.
The value of catastrophe theory is that until recently in the
social sciences

... (p)henomenon involving sudden large variations traditionally
have been assumed to be outside the reach of mathematical treat
ment, because they lacked what was considered to be an essential
precondition, the continuity of the dependence relation between
the variables...
There is also a related phenomenon of 'divergence,' when
discontinuity may occur with respect to a variable other than
time.
For example, sharp division of opinion can emerge in a
population gradually and smoothly ...
... catastrophe theory has now reached that sudden change
and divergencies are not only rational, and inevitable, but also
amenable to rigorous mathematical treatment.72

Consider Zeeman's example of fear and rage in a dog.

73

E. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory," Scientific American,
(April 1976), pp. 65-83.
^ E . Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers 1972-1977,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977.
72

E. Zeeman and C.A. Isnard, "Some Models in the Social
Sciences," Selected Papers 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., Reading, Mass., 1977, pp. 303-304.
73

E. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
o p . cit., p . 5.

Selected Papers, 1972-1977,
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... assume we can devise some vertical scale x representing
the resulting behavior of the dog running from fight to
flight, through intermediary behavior such as growling,
neutral, and avoiding. We want to plot the graph x as
a function of a and 3 . It is true, ..., that an increase
in rage causes an increase in aggression, an increase in
fear causes a decrease in aggression.
But what if we increase both rage and fear together?
The least likely behavior is for the dog to remain neutral,
and the most likely behavior is fight or flight, although
which of the two we choose may be unpredictable.
Therefore
one thing is sure:
there is no simple formula like
x = a - 3 ...
How do we analyze the situation? One answer is to look
at the likelihood.
So let us imagine a likelihood distri
bution for the behavior x in each of the following four
cases (see Figure 12) .

FIGURE 12

LIKELIHOOD OF AGGRESSION BEHAVIOR

Most Likely Behavior

Drives

1.
2.
3.
4.

Fight

Rage only
Fear only
Neither
Both rage and fear

FIight
Neutral
Fight or Flight

FIGHT

2.

FLIGHT

NEUTRAL

3.

FLIGHT
Source:

FIGHT

E.C. Zeeman, Ca tastrophe Th eo ry:
Selected Papers 1972-1977,
Addison- W es le y P ub lishing Company. Inc.. Reading, M a s s " 1977,

p. 5.

FIGURE 13
A CUSP C A TASTROPHE

R e s p o n s e Surface

D epe n d e n t V a r i a b l e

Control
V
Surface

ifurcation
Set
>

Independent
Va r :...ibles

Ln
Source:

Zeeman , Catast.rophe Theory:

'hole ct ed Paper s ,_19 72-197 7 , op. cit.

<X>
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The interesting case is Case 4, where the distribution
has gone bimodel... What catastrophe theory tells us is that if
the likelihood distribution looks like Figure 12, then the
graph will look like Figure 13. ^4

Zeeman argues that in mathematical structure, where pro
perties depend on the notions of order and topological structure,
the results are called qualitative, while those resting on algebraic
structures are called quantitative.^5
What catastrophe theory offers is the ability to model a
qualitative aspect of the social system.

One has to be somewhat

cautious in that Zeeman's definition of qualitative follows a mathe
matical set of ideas.

For example, in the figures below, the

curves are qualitatively equal though quantitatively different.

FIGURE 14
QUALITATIVELY EQUAL CURVES

Zeeman, E.C. "Catastrophe Theory: Draft for a Scientific
American Article," Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Pub
lishing Co., Reading'Mass., 1977, p. 5.
75Ibid., 319-321.
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That is, what can be said from a qualitative aspect is that
they are both increasing, smooth, and single valued.
ference may simply be due to scaling procedures.

7

6

The dif

This is different

from the situation in the physical sciences where, for example, choice
of scales in temperature measures has linear results under the same
conditions no matter what.

77

According to Zeeman, then, what cata

strophe theory adds in the social sciences is the qualitative
concepts of:

divergence, catastrophic change, fold point, etc.

The responsesurface generated is
fold in it; however,

7

8

peculiar in that it has a

it is this fold that gives the model its ability

to describe divergent and noncontinuous aspects of behavior.

Since

the real world is supposed to be a 4-dimensional space-time continuum,
Thom has identified what are called the seven elementary catastrophes
which allow one to model in from one to four dimensional space.

The

basic equations are shown in Table 3 below.
Of particular interest to this study is the cusp model which
relates

twocontrol variables to onebehavior variable (see Figure 13).

f(a,b,x) = 1/4
3f
— = n = x

7

Zeeman and Isnard,
7 7

78

Ibid., p. 322.
Ibid., p . 324 .

0

0

-it - ax -

3

- a - b ux

£. cit., p. 322.

1 / 2

bx^

TABLE 3
BASIC EQUATIONS OF SEVEN ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHES

dim x

dim c

Cuspoids

Fold
I
1
Cusp
1
2
Swallowtail
1
3
____________ Butterfly_________1___________4
Umbilics

Source:

Hyperbolic
Elliptic
Parabolic

2
2
2

3
3
4

_________
1/ 3
1/4
1/5
1/6

x^
x^
x
x

Function f____________

-•ax
?
- ax - 1/2 bx“
-ax - 1/2 bx - l/ cx
-ax - 1/2 bx^ - l/3cx
2

3

- l/4 dx

3
3
x^ + y + ax + by + cxv ^
x„ - xy + ax + by + c (x + y )
A
”
/
x y + y + ax + by + cx^ + dy2

0

E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theorv:
Selected Papers, 1972-1977, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977, p. 27.
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For a situation to be suitable for description by the cusp
catastrophe, five conditions are requisite:
1

. bimodality

2

. sudden transitions (catastrophes)

3. hysteresis
4. inaccessibility
5. divergence^
Figure 15 shows how the five conditions are related to one
another by the model.

It should be apparent from the diagram that,

as stated above, the fold is the focal point of the model.

Examining

each condition in the abstract, we can observe the general dynamics
of the model.
Bimodality is represented bv the top and bottom portion of
the fold.

It represents the domain where given combinations of the

system control variables can result in different types of behavior
(i.e., the system is multi varied).

The projection of the boundaries

of this region onto the control surface (ab-plane) form a cusp (called
the bifurcation set) which delimits the bimodal region.

80

Within

this region two different types of system behaviors are possible
from a given set of control variables.
79

Ultimately, the determination

E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory:
American Article," £. cit., p. 18.

Draft for a Scientific

0

80

Brian R. Flay, "Catastrophe Theory in Social Psychology:
Some Applications to Attitudes and Social Behavior," Behavioral
Science, Vol. 23, No. 5, Sept. 1978; Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers 1972-1977, op. cit.

FIGURE 15
F IVE REQ U I R E M E N T S FOR A CUSP C A TASTROPHE
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Catast rophe

iiimodalitv

Hvst

1- 1

ON
Source:
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of behavior in this region is made by examining the prior position
of the system, i.e., the system's history.
Sudden transitions (catastrophes) are accounted for at the
edges of the fold.

That is, as the system moves along the surface

toward the pleat, at some point a small increase in the control
variable will cause a sudden shift in behavior —
the other surface.

a transition to

To use Zeeman's example, if an angry dog is made

more fearful, at some point this behavior will abruptly change from
attack to retreat; conversely, if a fearful dog is progressively
enraged, at some point it will stop retreating, turn and attack.
This can be seen numerically by examining the values in Table 4 below.

TABLE 4
SYSTEM TRAJECTORY

a
0

.73
.87
1.38
1.58
1.83
2 . 0 0
2 . 0 0

18.00

b

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

X
0

-.25
-.30
-.50
-.60
-.75
-

1 . 0 0
2 . 0 0

3.00

The fact that catastrophes do not occur at the same place
but depend on the prior state of the system, incorporates lags into
the model which match certain real-world phenomena.

If one follows

the trajectories of lines A and B on the surface, over the same
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control values —
different places.

one notices that the sudden transitions occur in
For example, if a person starts out "in love" and

is made to increasingly dislike another, the complete change-over to
hate will not occur at the same point as a person who starts out dis
liking another.

Simply, a person in love endures more grief from a

second individual than does one who starts out disliking the
individual; obviously, the reverse is true.

In terms of the model,

movement coming from one direction precipitates a catastrophe in a
different place than does movement from a different direction.

This

lag is called hysteresis.
The middle sheet of the fold represents the inaccessible area
which is that of least likely behavior (remember the response surface
is the set of maximums and minimums).

In a love/hate situation, this

might be its state of neutrality, non-emotion, or apathy.

To see

why it is inaccessible, one can simply move a pencil across the model.
Upon reaching a fold edge, one either falls down to the bottom surface
or up to the top.

Examining the numbers in the preceding table, one

can see that the jump occurs at (a, b, x:

a=2, b=3, x=-l and x=2).

Divergent behavior is accounted for since as one moves out
from the edge toward the singularity,

which is the starting point

of separation between the two surfaces; small changes in the indepen
dent variables will cause the system to exhibit different types of
divergent behavior such as flight or attack,
81

E.C. Zeeman, "Catastrophe Theory:
American Article," o p . cit.

8

J

or love or hate.

The

Draft for a Scientific
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trajectory followed will depend on the values of the independent
variable (the state of the system), just prior to reaching the
singularity.
Zeeman uses a device called a catastrophe machine to explain
the dynamics of the model.
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What follows is a restatement in more

descriptive terms.
In Figure 16 below, there are two graphs which correspond to
the areas of catastrophe surfaces.

Graph (a) shows that the surfaces

outside the bifurcation set are minima and represent the single sheet

FIGURE 16
GRAPHS OF MINIMA AND MAXIMA POINTS

(a)

82Ibid., p. 10-11.

(b)

points, while graph (b) represents minima and maxima
within the bifurcation set.

(open dot)

If a point were to move along the

surface from say right to left one gets the situation shown in
Figure 17.

FIGURE 17
CATASTROPHE THEORY DYNAMIC

Source:

E.C. Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers 1972-1977,
Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Inc., Reading, Mass., 1977,
p.
.
1

1
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As the point moves along the surface it eventually crosses into the
bifurcation set and a new minimum and maximum appear as shown in
(b), but nothing happens in terms of the choice of surface.

Upon

crossing the center of the bifurcation set, the original minimum
starts to break down and the second minimum continues to deepen (d).
Eventually, the first minimum "shrinks" to the level of the maximum
(i.e., breakdown completely), and a jump occurs to the second minimum
(other surface) at the point it leaves the bifurcation set (set e ) .
The point then continues along the other surface.

Notice that if the

process is reversed, then the shift to the original surface does not
occur at (e) but rather at (b) .
As stated above, the most common form of the surface presented
in the literature is that given by Zeeman.

8

3

Recognizing that there

are a variety of other formulations possible, for illustrative pur
poses, the Zeeman formulation will be used to develop important
related equations.

x^ - a - bx =

0

( )
1

The equation of the singularity set being its first partial derivation
of ( ) with respect to x or:
1
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Zeeman, Catastrophe Theory:
Selected Papers 1972-1977,
op . cit.; Flay, o£. cit.; Leonard Starobin, "Our Changing Evolution:
Strategies for 1980," General Systems Yearbook, Anatol Rapoport (ed.)
Vol. XXI, 1976, pp. 3-46.
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3f
„
^ " 3x

. .
<2)

2

- b

To develop an equation of the projection of the set of singularities
in the control parameter plane (the ab plane) one solves equation ( )
2

in terms of b and substitutes back in equation (1) to get equation (3)

27a2 = Ab

(3)

3

Notice in the figures that the ’b ' variable bisects the bifurcation
set.

In fact for positive values of *b ', the surface splits, and,

as 'b' increases, the amount of the split increases.

For this

reason, when the control variable axes are perpendicular to the cusp,
the terms normal factor and splitting factor are used to describe 'a'
and 'b' respectively.
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When the control factors lie on either side
8

of the cusp, they are called conflicting factors.

5

See Figure 18

and 19. Examples of the kinds of phenomena modelled by the cusp are
given in Table 4 below.
While catastrophe theory has been heralded as a 'fantastic'
aid to modelling in the social sciences, it is not without its

E.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Mani
folds Tokyo 1973, Akio Hattori (ed.) University of Tokyo Press,
Tokyo, 1975.
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FIGURE 18

FIGURE 19

NORMAL AND SPLITTING FACTORS

Source:

CONFLICTING FACTORS

E.C. Zeeman, "Applications of Catastrophe Theory," Mani
folds Tokyo 1973, Akio Hattori (ed.) University of Tokyo
Press, Tokyo, 1.976.

critics (Sussman^ and Kolata^) .

Probably the most effective

criticisms have been those leveled at catastrophe theory by Sussman
and Zahler.
There is no doubt as to the accuracy and/or propriety of
their criticisms.

Unfortunately, they may have gone too far in

suggesting that Zeeman is tautological and that catastrophe theory

^Hector J. Sussman and Raphael S. Zahler, "A Critique of
Applies Catastrophe Theory in the Behavioral Science," Behavior
Science, Vol. 23, No. 5, (Sept. 1978), pp. 383-389.
87
Clothes."

G.B. Kolata, "Catastrophe Theory:
Science (April 1977).

The Emperor Has No
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has nothing really new to offer.

In part, the clash seems to be

symptomatic of the traditional battle between purist and pragmatist
(or theoretician and empiricist).

At one extreme the purist looks

for truth apart from reality, while at the other extreme the prag
matist looks for reality apart from truth.
Sussman and Zahler seem to have gone beyond a constructive
role to a destructive role.

Their most damaging attack occurs on

page 387 and is repeated below:

88

(1) Every surface can be approximated arbitrarily closely
by a surface in S.
(2) The surfaces in £ are nonrigid in the following sense:
If S is in £ and if U and V are disjoint regions in
space, and T is an arbitrary surface in V, then there
are surfaces S' and £ that are arbitrarily close to
T and V, while coinciding with S on U .
(3) If F is any finite set of points whatsoever, then
there is a surface in £ that passes through all points
in F.
Property (1) implies that, for an experimenter,
there is no way to test the hypotheses that a surface
is in
88

£.

Indeed, all observations have an error.

Sussman and Zahler, oj). cit., p. 387.
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Therefore, any arbitrary surface S is observationally
indistinguishable from some surface S' in E .

(Take

S' to be a surface in E that approximates S to within
a distance smaller than the error).

Property (3) says

that any set of observations is consistent with the
hypothesis that the set of possible states is a surface
in E .
Finally, property (2) asserts that a knowledge
of the surface in some region says nothing whatsoever
about the surface in any other region.
What the preceding remarks amount to is the
following very simple conclusion:

If we wish to describe

systems that obey equilibrium equations, then Thom's
theorem is not helpful.

It is not much better than the

tautologous statement that an equilibrium surface is a
surface.

Knowing that S is not just any surface, but

a surface that satisfies the properties of Thom's
theorem, gives very little extra information about S
since the properties that occur in Thom's theorem are
local.
Any social scientist reading the above comments would pro
bably be strongly tempted to pass over catastrophe theory as a
somewhat useless curiosity.

However, this would be a mistake.

Unlike

the hard sciences, the behavioral scientist does not merely talk about
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, she/he lives with it.

Research
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in the behavioral sciences is nor neat and clean, it is messy with
a lot of slippage.
problems.

The mathematician, of course, can assume away

Specifically, a point is a dimensionless entity that

is perfect.

But points do not exist except in the minds of

mathematicians.

If the behavioralist needs to deal with a point

empirically it is probably fuzzy, not symmetrical, and has dimension.
Furthermore, one cannot overlook a possible tool because
it is not perfect in every way.

In this regard, many of the stati

stical techniques used in the behavioral sciences are subject to
the criticism through 3 above.

And in using them we are not using,

in Sussman's words, chicken soup to cure appendicitis
recognize the limitations.

89

if we

Consider, for example, the much used

(even overused) technique of regression analysis (this refers not
just to linear regression but rather, the family of techniques).

If

one substitutes the term "the class of all regression surfaces" in
the above quote for

E, then in the main, Sussman and Zahler's com

ments are equally damaging to that technique.

This yields the

following:
(1) There is no way to tell if the hypothetical surface
is really a member of E, i.e., a regression surface.
(2) Knowledge of the surface in a given region says
absolutely nothing about the surface in another
89

Ibid., p . 386.
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region, hence, one regularly invokes the concept of
a relevant range.
(3) Certainly any set of finite points can be fitted by a
curve in 2 .

In fact, this tends to be the classic

student error, e.g., ten observations, ten variables
and an R

2

r ,
of 1.

Should one then throw out regression analysis?
we recognize its weaknesses and apply it carefully?

Or, should
There is a

tendency for the model developer to confuse the model with the
system itself, thereby becoming overly committed to the construct.
All models are, at best, construals of the systems they attempt to
represent.

This suggests that many models may be appropriate for

a given system, depending on the situation.

Unfortunately, this

obvious fact gets ignored when one runs into criticism of the type
leveled by Sussman and Zahler.
Catastrophe theory is not useless to the behavioral sciences.
At the same time, it is not magic either.

And, perhaps, it is not

catastrophe theory that is important to the behavioral scientist,
but instead, the catastrophe surface.

The single biggest contri

bution of catastrophe theory to the behavioral sciences seems to
be that it moves one away from single valued response surfaces.

For

years the richness found in many behavioral situations has been lost
because they have been mapped down (assumed away) to single valued
ness (which is very much akin to single mindedness).

If catastrophe
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theory does nothing else, it may help to move the behavioral science
into a new era of modelling, not because of some inherent truth in
the theory, but through the realization that response surfaces do not
have to be single valued and smooth.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION OF THE MODEL

Introduction

If one were to arrange the theoretical models described
earlier on a continuum from general to specific, they would tend
to go from highly descriptive overviews of the entire process, to
highly quantitative models of very specific aspects of bargaining
such as optimal wage determination.

However, as Boulding^ points
2

out, the trade-off is general applicability for content.

Oliva's

concept of a maximal construal would say that the best model possible
of collective bargaining would be the set of all construals of the
bargaining process.

The choice of a single model immediately causes

the loss of some aspects of the process.
However, from a pragmatic viewpoint, one must work with
single models or hybrids which integrate several models.

Returning

to the continuum discussed above, it should be noted that the quan
titative models tend to be too restrictive while the verbal models
are not restrictive enough.

There needs to be models which can

‘'"Kenneth Boulding, "General Systems Theory — The Skeleton
of Science," Management Science, (April 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 197-208.
2
Terence A. Oliva, "Laszlo, Semantics and Systems Defini
tions: A Critique," Behavioral Science, (May 1976), Vol. 21, No. 3,
pp. 196-199.
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describe

the overall behavior of the bargaining system in such a

way that the behavior can ultimately be explained, predicted, and
controlled, and that tests of the model are replicable by other
scientists.

That is, there is a need for a descriptive (qualita

tive) model that has the benefits of mathematical rigor.

In 1977

3

Oliva/Capdevielle
model.

made the first attempt at developing such a

Using catastrophe theory, which purports to allow the inclu

sion of qualitative factors with mathematical rigor, a model was
developed based on the limits type model mentioned earlier.
particular, the Stagner-Rosen

4

In

formulation of the model was used.

Since 1977, the model has evolved to its present state.
The choice of a limits-type model was made for the following
five reasons:
1. It is on the highly verbal end of the aforementioned
scale.
2. It is a fairly clear overall representation of the
bargaining process in general.
3. It allows for the representation of a variety of
qualitative behaviors (such as strike, lockout,
negotiation).
3

Terence A. Oliva and Christel M. Capdevielle, "Collective
Bargaining as a Catastrophe Model," Proceedings of the Academy
of Management, 1977, pp. 177-181.
4

R. Stagner and H. Rosen, Psychology of Union-Management Rela
tions , Belmont, California, Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1965.
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4. It seems to most nearly fit all of the definitions of
collective bargaining given in Chapter 2.
5. It is commonly used as a pedogogical tool in explaining
the bargaining process.
In systems language, the model seems to be descriptively
homomorphic and essentially isomorphic to the bargaining process.

A New Collective Bargaining Model

It is believed that the mapping of the Stagner-Rosen limitstype model onto the catastrophe surface is a major step in improving
the Stagner and Rosen formulation, as well as developing a new and
dynamically descriptive approach to collective bargaining.

In addi

tion to the two control variables of Stagner and Rosen, the mapping
adds a third dimension, the behavior surface.

Figure 20 represents

the mapping of the model onto the cusp catastrophe model.

Bargaining

behavior of the negotiating system ranges from strike to lockout.
As a general characteristic, one may view the behavior on the two
positions of the surface as strike-prone or lockout-prone.

Remember

the behavior being described is the negotiating system *s behavior not
the behavior of the parties except as they integrate to form a
single unit of behavior.

(See Figure 21)

For a situation to be

modelled by the cusp catastrophe, it must meet the five conditions
of:
1. Bimodality
2. Sudden Transitions

FIGURE 20
C A T A S T R O P H E T H E O R Y M O D E L OF C O L L ECTIVE B A R G A I N I N G

Informal
D i scussions

Union
^ Militancy
Strike
Management
Militancy

Lockout
— B a r g aining B e h avior
inion
Intensity

M a n a gement
\
Intensity

Mg t . Tol.
Limit

Un i o n T o l e r a n c e Limit

Bargaining
Zone

FIGURE 21
BARGAINING BEHAVIOR OF THE SYSTEM
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3. Hysteresis
4. Inaccessibility
5. Divergence
For this model, each of the criteria are discussed below.
The two independent variables are the management and union bargain
ing intensities, and the bargaining behavior of the system ranges
from strike to lockout.

Bargaining intensities are not synonymous

with a set of demands or issues, but rather a composite index of the
participants' perceptions about issues such as wages, fringe benefits,
hours of work, bargaining equity, emotions, etc.

Bimodality

Management and union tolerance limits set the boundaries of
the bifurcation set.
take place.

Within these boundaries, formal negotiations

The range of behavior, of course, includes all behavior

such as formal, informal, and non-formal bargaining.

Within the

bifurcation set, two forms of behavior are possible (i.e., strike
prone or lockout prone).

The least likely behavior is that of

neutrality because of the conflict nature of bargaining —

i.e.,

a distribution of fixed resources between two parties.
Once the boundaries are crossed, the behavior of the system
becomes unimoda] and formal negotiations are not engaged in.
does not mean that no negotiation takes place; but, rather, it
occurs in or through informal or non-formal contacts.

This
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Sudden Transitions

If during the negotiations, formal, informal, or non-formal,
bargaining intensities increase to the point where movement is
toward the fold (i.e., toward the opposing party's surface), then
on crossing the tolerance limit, a catastrophe will occur.
there will be an abrupt change in system behavior.

Thus

Consider a situa

tion where management is militant yet negotiates with the union
(i.e., within the bifurcation set).

If management pushes and the

union yields, the union may resist further acquiesance because of
feeling that it has "given in,""played fair," or "negotiated in good
faith."

As a result, the union bargaining intensities may go up.

Management, however, after winning some issues may experience a
decline in its real bargaining intensities, yet continue to push
the union, feeling that it can take advantage of the union's apparent
retreat.

Movement along the surface would follow path A on Figure 22.

Suddenly there would be a shift to the strike prone surface as soon
as the union's tolerance limit was reached.

The reverse is also true

or can be seen by examining line B on Figure 22.

Notice that while

sudden transitions can occur, they do not have to occur.

There may

be a smooth transition from strike to lockout and vice versa by moving
along the back surface behind the cusp (see line C Figure 22).

In

real-world situations, this may represent a required or otherwise
imposed cooling-off situation, when intensities are lowered, then
rise again at a later date.

FIGURE 22
POSSIBLE M O V E M E N T ON THE B A R G A I N I N G SURFACE

Informal
Discussions
Union
Militancy
Strike

Ma n a g e m e n t
Militant

Lockout

Bargaining Behavior
Union
^
Intensity

Management
kIntensitv
Mg t . To 1.
Limit

Union Tolerance Limit

Bargaining
Zone
00

82

Hysteresis

Returning to lines A and B one can see that once a tolerance
limit has been exceeded, it takes more effort before the system
shifts back to its original position.
at different points.

That is, catastrophes occur

A bargaining system which finally moves

to a strike prone position from a lockout prone one requires

signi

ficantly greater increases in management's bargaining intensities
to get it back to a lockout prone position (the same is true in
reverse).

Thus there is a form of hysteresis in the behavior.

Inaccessibility

During formal negotiations the bargaining parties are
expected to attempt to win as many of their respective issues as
possible.

Thus, the bargaining behavior of the system will not

exhibit neutrality.

And, in fact, this would be the least likely

behavior; and, therefore, it is not possible to reach the middle
sheet.

Obviously this compliments the assumption of bimodality

(see Figure 23) .

Divergence

As bargaining intensities are increased during the informal
start-up period, the system moves out on the surface.

Upon reaching

the singularity, a small difference in the bargaining intensities
will move the system onto one of two totally different types of

FIGURE 23
BIMODAL NATURE OF BARGAINING BEHAVIOR
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of behavior.

Thus, slight changes in initial starting conditions

can change the entire course of behavior for the bargaining system.

Comments on the Model

What the model provides is a way to include dynamism in
modelling collective bargaining behavior.

At a minimum, the new

model is a pedogogical aid for showing students the variety of
behaviors demonstrated in bargaining situations in fairly easy
graphic terms.

Furthermore, its quantitative underlyings allow

researchers to use empirically-oriented approaches such as sensitivv
analysis which can lead to precise testing and replication.

Unlike

the quantitative models presented earlier, construction of the model
does not yield an instantaneous solution (outcome) without indicating
the. process of how that optimum solution was obtained.

Instead, the

model shows the process of bargaining over time not apart from time.
Additionally, the model does not depend on the assumption of rational
behavior critical to utility theory based models.
Another conclusion from the model is that initial conditions
are critical in setting the trajectories for the bargaining behaviors
It would be prudent, consequently, for each participant to spend a
great deal of effort eliminating unintended cues which would trigger
increases in the opponent's intensities (such as inflammatory state
ments) or prior to the start of negotiation activities.

This results

from the fact that a slight change in the initial conditions can
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change the trajectory from strike prone to lockout prone and
vice-versa.
Lastly, the model also suggests that there are a number of
"mini" catastrophes which can occur.
are probably almost imperceptible.

Those near the singularity
Yet, once a shift occurs, it

is harder to get the system back to where, it was because of the
hysteresis effect.

The small shifts back and forth may result from

emotion shifts early in the process.

Additionally, this may represent

various types of "mini" crises which occur during negotiations well
prior to a strike or lockout.
Precise statement of the mathematical surface of the model
has not been given since it must ultimately be determined from realxrorld data.

The model used for experimental purposes was:
3

3

0 = x^ -/2 (4 + x) a ' + /2 (4 - x) b'
where
1
a ' = /2 (a + b)
1
b' = /2 (b - a) and a and b are the independent
variables of the equation of the cusp given earlier.

The development

of the above equation is described in the next chapter.

It should

be noted that it is descriptively equivalent to Figure 20 except
the origin is located at the cusp.
The model also suggests some new insights regarding bargain
ing.

For example, notice that as bargaining intensities increase,
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the bargaining zone widens.

This is probably a result of the fact

that as intensities go up there are more issues to deal with.

Hence,

with a greater issue complex there are more trade-offs possible, and
a larger bargaining zone (see Figure 24).
This is unlike the basic limits-model approach which fixes
the limits for a given issue or issue set; limits are flexible
depending on the intensities.

Notice also that the intensities do

not work in direct opposition to one another (180° out of phase)
but rather are orthogonal (90°).

The interpretation is that in real

bargaining, the bargaining units are not actually opposing one
another, but rather are pulling in different directions.

Where

actual opposites occur, this is a pure conflict situation or war,
and organizational demise is the most likely occurrence.

An ortho

gonal relationship allows for extreme differences, yet suggests
that organizational demise is highly unlikely.

That is, while the

pull is in different directions, the system is not pulled apart.

FIGURE 24
OPPOSING AND ORTHOGONAL BARGAINING INTENSITIES
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CHAPTER IV

METHODOLOGY

The Experimental Design:

An Overview

Conceptually, the experimental design is simple.

Data were

gathered from union and management teams participating in a simulated
bargaining game which yielded estimates of a system behavior, as well
as union and management bargaining intensities.

The values of the

bargaining intensities were substituted into a modified version of
the cusp catastrophe theory equation to generate predicted values of
the system behavior.

Finally, the predicted values were correlated

with the actual values of system behavior to see if the model's
predicted output matched the actual behavior.

Mathematical Conversion of the Model

As stated in Chapters Two and Three,

the original form of

the behavior surface as normally found in the literature is:

x

3

(1)

a - bx = 0

With the equation of the singularity set being the first partial
derivative of the function with respect to x, or:

(see Figure 25)

(2)
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FIGURE 25

3x“ = b

+ = /b73
Plot of s i n g u l a r i t i e s on xb plane
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The equation of the projection of the set of singularities is found
by solving equation (2) in terms of b and substituting back in the
original equation which yields equation (3) below:

27a2 = 4b3

(3)

For plotting purposes, equation (3) may be rewritten as follows:

+ a =

2^3

(4)

/27

Note that, in this form, "a" is a normal factor and "b" is
a splitting factor.

However, for this bargaining situation, a

conflicting factors model is needed.

Consider what it would mean

if bargaining intensities could take on negative values.

For

example, it might suggest that a union would refuse to take fringe
benefits and possibly would strike in order not to get the benefits.
A plot of equation three is given in Figure 26, and the
values used are presented in Table 5.

FIGURE 26
STANDARD CUSP DESCR I P T I O N
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TABLE 5
SELECTED VALUES OF THE STANDARD CUSP EQUATION

27a2 = 4b2
a

■

-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

b
6.9
6.2
5.5
4.8
3.9
3.0
1.0
0
1.9
3.0
3.0
4.8
5.5
6.2
6.9

The means of converting from a splitting factors model to a
conflicting factors model is through a 45° rotation of the control
surface about the behavior axis.

This rotation is accomplished as

follows:

Let sin 0 =

R

and cos 0 =

R

If the angle of rotation is (j>, then the new coordinates (a1, b') are
b’
a'
given by the sin (0—4>) = — , and cos (0-cJ)) = —
(see Figure 27).
K
K
trigonometric identities,

By

FIGURE 27
STANDARD AXIS ROTATION

kd

U>
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R cos

(0—cj)) = a' =

R cos 0 cos <J> + R sin 0 sin cf>

R sin

= b' =

-R cos 0 sin <J)+ Rsin 0 cos <j>

and by substitution,

a' = a cos ()) + b
b ' =

sin d

-a sin (|) + b

cos (})

In matrix notation,

[ab]

;coscj>
i sin cf>
i

- sin $ !

=[a'b']

cos (J) |
’
1

At -j- radians (45°) both the cos c|) and sin § equal /2 and

1

^2

(a + b)

1
b' = Yi

(b - a)

a' =

The rotation will cause the result shown in Figure 28.
Notice that due to the spread of the cusp exceeding 90° as the
curve goes out, it cuts back through a' and b'.

This means that

the shape of the original function does not match that assumed by
the Oliva/Capdevielle model.

To correct the situation, the original

equation for the surface must be modified.

Through trial and error,

FIGURE 28
STANDARD CUSP AFTER AXIS ROTATION

27a

= 4b

45

U1
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a new equation was developed that appears to meet the descriptive
requirements of the model, with the exception that its cusp starts
at the origin.

The new equation becomes:

3
x3 - ^

3
+ x) a' +

^

b' = 0

Obviously, the new transformed equation is more difficult to
work with; consequently, the control variables will be measured in
terms of "a'" and "b'" and then rotated back to "a" and "b" for ease
in determining the value of x, which will still require the evalua
tion of a cubic equation.

The new working equation set becomes:

x3 - 12 a- 3bx = 0

(l1)

x3 - b = 0

(2')

36a2 = b 3

(3')

+a = '^2

(V)

Figure 29 shows the new cusp and Table 6 gives both rotated
and unrotated values.
The nature of the fold can be examined by taking a slice at
"a" for a given value for "b".

If, for example, "b" is chosen as 1,

then the slice may be depicted as shown in Figure 30.

Notice that

the singularities (edges of the fold) are at +1 and indicate the
point at which catastrophes can occur.
in the xb-plane is shown in Figure 31.

A plot of the singularity set

FIGURE 29
REVISED CUSP W I T H R O T A T E D AND U N R O T A T E D AXES
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TABLE 6
SELECTED VALUES FOR THE REVISED CUSP

36a

2

= b

3

unrotated

rotated
b

-5.27
-4.50
-3.77
-3.08
-2.45
-

1.86

-1.33
- .87
- .47
- .17
0
.17
.47
.87
1. 33
1.86

2.45
3.08
3.77
4.50
5.27

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

a
3. 34
3.18
2.99
2.76
2.51
2.22
1.89
1.51
1.08
.59
0
.83
1.75
2.73
3.77
4.85
5.97
7.13
8.32
9.55
10.80

b
10.80
9.55
8.32
7.13
5.97
4.85
3. 77
2.73
1.75
.83
0
.59
1.08
1.51
1.89
2.22
2.51
2. 76
2.99
3.18
3.34
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It is assumed that the above mathematical modifications
reasonably brought the mathematical model in line with the descrip
tive model presented in Chapter Three.

It is recognized that more

empirical work would be needed to develop the "actual" model.

In

view of the claims made by proponents of catastrophe theory about
its ability to model social science situations, there should be no
problem dealing with whatever variance exists.

The Simulated Bargaining Game

The Murthy (1978) bargaining game was used to simulate a
collective bargaining situation.

Choice of a role-playing simula

tion was made because of its greater ability to more closely
approximate real world bargaining over a number of dimensions as
pointed out earlier in Chapter Two.

The Murthy game had been

tested and from thorough discussions with those who had participated
in it, there was a general concensus that it met their perceptions
of what a collective bargaining situation would really be like.
This is an important point since the accuracy of the data derived
from the subjects is heavily dependent in part on their perceptions
of the realism of the situation.
Basically, Murthy's game consists of a contract which must
be negotiated over twenty articles concerning items such as vacations,
wages, grievance procedures, holidays, overtime, and the like.

The

articles of negotiation, however, were rearranged from Murthy's
order to go from relatively neutral types of interaction (such as
holidays) to more emotionally-charged ones (such as wages).

This
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was done in order to aid in controlling the bargaining intensities,
since the general direction of the change in intensities was assumed
to be moving upward (i.e., increasing) because of the greater import
ance of successively later articles.
In order to win the game, subjects bargained over each of the
articles and attempted to "win" them for their team.

Although they

were told that certain articles were weighted toward either labor
or management, they were not informed as to which articles fell
which way or the actual amount of weighting involved.

Table 7

provides a list of articles and the payoff points which are associ
ated with each.
Articles 1, 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, and 19 are in manage
ment's favor while Articles 3, 9, and 17 are in union's favor.

In

order to win an article deemed to be in favor of the opposing team,
and thereby receive the associated payoff points, a substantial
shift in policy away from the status quo would have to occur.

To

win an article said to be in one's favor, a team would merely have
to maintain the status quo.

Appendix A contains a description of

the bargaining game.

The Subjects

Sixteen junior and senior Business Administration majors
were identified through the use of an attitudinal scale called Mach V
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TABLE 7
PAYOFF SCHEDULE FOR BARGAINING GAME ARTICLES

Article
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Payoff
2
0
2
0
0
0
2
2
2

10

2

11

0

12

0

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

4
0
5
5
4
5
15

20

0

developed by Christie^ and others (see Appendix B ) .

Basically, the

instrument attempts to evaluate a person's approach to dealing with
people, "especially to the degree to which he feels other people
are manipulable in interpersonal situations."

2

It was assumed that

"'‘R. Christie, et. a l ., Unpublished manuscript, Department of
Social Psychology, Columbia University, 1968.
2

John Robinson and Phillip Shaver, Measures of Social
Psychological Attitudes, Institute for Social Research, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1973, pp. 590-602.
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individuals who scored high on the questionnaire would be more com
petitive in the game more and bargain with more intensity than those
scoring low.

Mach V scores range from 40 to 160.

All participants

had scores not loxver than 110 on the scale; this represents 21.89%
of the total respondents (22% of males and 21% of females had at
least this score or higher).

In addition to the choice of partici

pants by scores on the Mach V scale, only male students were chosen
to help reduce as much as possible the effects of extraneous
variables such as male-female interpersonal interactions.

However,

so that students would not know that females would be excluded, the
Mach V examination was given to both males and females in four pro
duction management sections (137 students).

The utilization of

students in production management courses was decided upon for two
reasons.

First, the researcher taught the four sections of this

class which made the process of administering the questionnaire
relatively simple and not overly disturbing to the students.
Secondly, for the most part, the students in the course were roughly
at the same point in their college careers due to the general sequenc
ing of the course within the College of Business curriculum.

This

again helped to aid in developing a somewhat homogeneous pool of
subjects to draw from.
As an inducement to participate in the game in a serious
manner, each student was told he would be awarded 10 points toward
his final grade in the course for just playing the game, and an
additional 10 points if his team won the game.

A winning student
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could earn up to 5% of his total grade.

Each student was also paid

$2.50 per hour for his time as well as was provided with soft
drinks and snacks.

The Experiment

The students were divided into 4 groups, each group having
two union and two management representatives.

Each group was

viewed as a separate bargaining system for the purpose of the experi
ment and played the game continuously for 225 minutes (3.75 hours).
Of this time, 180 minutes were divided into nine 20 minute bargain
ing sessions.

The other forty five minutes were broken up into five

minute intervals between bargaining sessions in order to measure and
control the independent variables.

In order to try and cover as

much of the surface as possible, an attempt to control the independ
ent variables was made as follows.

Group 1 was designated

a

control

group and no attempt was made to modify the independent variables.
In Group 2, an attempt was made to increase management demand inten
sities while keeping union demand intensities fairly stable.

In

Group 3, an attempt was made to increase union's demand intensities
while keeping management demand intensities fairly stable.

Lastly,

in Group 4, an attempt was made to increase both management's and
union's demand intensities.

It was hoped that this procedure would

"drive" the groups across the surface in different directions so
that a cross section of the various tracks that a bargaining system
might take would be sampled.
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The means of attempting to control the independent variable
was accomplished by giving feedback to the groups during the fiveminute break period between bargaining sessions.

If, for example,

there was a desire to increase management demand intensities, the
management team was told that they were not. being aggressive enough
or that they appeared to be losing the game.

At the same time, the

union team would be told that they were doing fine.

To minimize

time for the feedback process, the researcher and a faculty member
provided the feedback stimuli.

Each alternated in providing feed

back to a team to attempt to block for differences in responses to
the different individuals.
The environmental setting for the bargaining rounds was a
behavioral laboratory where the teams were under both visual and
audio surveillance throughout the entire bargaining process.

Visual

contact was made through one-way mirrors while audio contact was
made through an intercom system which was switched to transmit
only.

In addition, to the bargaining room, each team had its own

conference room for use throughout the process
questionnaires, and for feedback discussions.

to fill out
Appendix C presents

the basic layout of the experimental setting.
Given the unpredictability of behavior systems there is
almost no way to guarantee that the desired control was absolutely
maintained.

However, even if the systems operate on their own,

as long as they play the game honestly, the data obtained are
value in testing the model.

of
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The Measurement

The measurement of demand intensities was accomplished by
using the first three questions on questionnaire number 1, as
shown in Appendix D, while the measurement of the system's behavior
was taken by using questionnaire 2 in Appendix E and question
#1 on questionnaire number 1.

Both of these are modifications

of the ones used by Murthy in his study.

The brevity of the

questionnaire was necessary to minimize the time involved in
gathering the data and consequently to reduce probe effect.
It if recognized that a more accurate measurement would probably
require longer questionnaires, however, a modicum of precision
must be sacrificed if the behavior system is to remain rela
tively unchanged by the measurement process.

Additionally, that

they are essentially the same measurement tools as Murthy's
helps because they have been pre-tested.
Scoring of the questionnaire proceeds as follows.

After

each round of bargaining, the questionnaires were, given to each
team member in the team's respective conference room.

Bargaining

intensity for the round is simply the team response average for
questions 1 through 3.

For example, the following set of

responses were found after a round (see Table 8).
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TABLE 8

SAMPLE CALCULATIONS OF THE BARGAINING INTENSITIES

Management
Player 1

Union

Player 2

Player 1

Player 2

3

2

5

5

2

2

A

4

4

3

3

5

12 <---------------> 14

-> 7

^

6

= 2.67

~
6

= 4.33

Then, management bargaining intensity for the round would be 2.67
while unions' would be 4.33.
Determination of system behavior is found similarly by
averaging the responses of all players to question 4 on questionnaire
1 and adding them to the average response on questionnaire 2.
Responses to question 4 are unidirectional in the sense that they
register only intensity (points).

Since the behavior range is posi

tive and negative, management responses are assigned a negative
value before averaging.

Thus,

the response range on question 4

is from -8 to 8 depending on how the individual perceives the
situation.

(see Table 9)

TABLE 9
SAMPLE CALCULATIONS OF SYSTEM BARGAINING BEHAVIOR

Management

Union

Player 1

Player 2

Questionnaire 1 #4

-2

-2

Questionnaire 2 #1

0

1

13
-4
_4
9
Behavior of the system

9
f = 2.25
4

Player 1

Player 2

7

6

=13

5

= 9

= -4
=

1

4

10
^ = 2.50
4

2.25
2.50
4.75
109

110

Determination of predicted values through the use of the
equation was as follows.

For each pair of bargaining intensities

the cubic equation was solved for values of x.

Where a single

root was generated, that root was taken as the system's predicted
behavior.

If triple roots were generated, the middle value was

eliminated as it represented the middle sheet point.

Choice between

the two remaining roots was made according to the past history of
the system as catastrophe

theory suggests it should be done.

That

is, if the system was on the bottom sheet (lockout prone) for the
last round and the values of the intensities don't take the system
across the bifurcation set, then the lower values would be chosen.
If the bifurcation set boundary had been crossed, then the highest
value would be chosen.

Statistical Procedures

It is assumed that the questionnaires yield interval data.
The values for the independent variables (i.e., the management and
union bargaining intensities) are rotated

7T

radians, substituted

into the equation for the surface; i.e.,

x3 - 12a - 3bx = 0

and the cubic equation is
system behavior).

solved for the values of x (the bargaining

This generates a set of predicted behavior based
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on the model which is compared with the system's actual behavior
as measured by questionnaire 2 and 1.
In the ideal situation, the actual and predicted values would
be identical, and a plot of actual against predicted would produce
a 45° line coming out of the origin.

Since this situation is

unlikely, it is expected that there would not be a perfect linear
relationship between actual and predicted values.

Therefore, the

following hypotheses is tested:

There is a positive relationship between
the predicted and actual values.

is the main test of the descriptive, accuracy of the model
for purposes of the proposed study.

Additional support is obtained

by examining the difference between the scores, which in the ideal
case would be zero.

Since it is assumed that the questionnaires

provide interval data, the Pearson Product Moment Coefficient: of
Correlation was used to evaluate

.

Each of the four groups were

evaluated individually, then the entire data set was evaluated in
total.

CHAPTER V

RESULTS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Results

Scoring of the Game

Results of the bargaining game were relatively even.

In

groups I and III the union team won while in II and IV the manage
ment team won.

The scores are presented in Table 10.

TABLE 10
TEAM SCORES BY GROUP
FROM THE BARGAINING GAMES

Group_______I______II
Management
Union

6
44

31
14

III

IV

20
30

32
18

Interestingly enough, in groups II and III where control was
applied to attempt to drive up the intensities, the winning teams
were those who received the positive feedback.

That is, in group II,

attempts were made to stimulate management's intensities while
union's intensities were held stable with the reverse occurring in
group III.

For group II, management won while for group III, union
112
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won.

In the control group union won while in the group where both

intensities were driven up, management won the game.
The feedback procedure appears to have been successful in
general.

Average intensities for the entire data set were 3.8 for

management and 3.19 for union.
intense.

Thus, labor in general was less

Breakdown by groups tend to support the'fact that the feed

back worked in general.

See Table 11.

TABLE 11
AVERAGE BARGAINING INTENSITY RESPONSES BY GROUP

Group
Management
Union

I

II

III

IV

3.6
3.6

2.9
1.9

3.37
3.1

5.29
4.03

The Basic Data Set

A summary of the data from the questionnaire is presented in
Table 12 below.
in Appendix F.

Responses of the subjects by question are presented
It should be noted that four strikes occurred over

the 36 observations while there were no lockouts.
Predicted values for the behavior system are presented in
Table 13.

The solution set and rotated intensities are presented

in Appendix G .

TABLE 12
SUMMARY OF DATA FROM Ol’F.STIONNAIRES*

Group I
Rounds
1
i
3

u
5
6
7
8
9

Intensit ies
Management
Labor
1.17
9.00
9.33
9.17
6.17
.83
9.83
3.17
9.33

3.50
9.S3
3.17
9. 67
9.00
1.33
3.17
3.83
5.50

Group I!

Behavior
Svstem
1.25
1.50
- .25
-1.00
-1.25
.25
- .75
.50
- .50

Intens it ies
Management
Labor
2. 33
2. 33
9.33
3.17
.83
9.50
9.83
1 .67
3.50

1 .3 1
2.67
9 .50
. 50
0
1.67
9.67
.83
1.50

Group IV

Group III

Bellav for
Svster.
0
1 .00
2 .50
.50
.50
.2 5
2.25
- .25
-2.00

Intensit ies
Management
Labor
4.50
1.17
6.17
3. 33
6.17
2.00
3.00
2. 33
1.67

4 .99
2.67
6. 50
2.33
6.17
2.5 0
2. 33
2.17
1.50

Behavior
Svstem
0
.50
5.25
- .75
5.25
- .75
- .50
1.25
-1.25

Intensities
Management
Labor
1.83
4.67
4.17
6.00
5.83
7.50
7.00
4.67
6.00

.43
.93
2.93
4.77
6.43
7.50
7.27
5.10
4.77

Behavio:
Svstem
3
-1.5
-2.25
-2.50
-1.00
7.50
7.50
1.00
1.75

*This table summarizes the data gathered from the questionnaire.
The first two columns of each group represents the average
intensities bv round for management and labor.
The third column represents actual system behavior as derived from the
questionnaires.
Notice also that in general, the intensities moved as intended through the feedback procedure.
Only
Group Ill's data in the last portion of the game does not seem to conform to the desired result.
However, if one looks
at the total averages presented in Table 11, management tended to score higher in general, thus the feedback may have
worked as intended, even though the values are slightly lower.
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TABLE 13
PREDICTED BARGAINING BEHAVIOR SCORES GENERATED BY THE MODEL

Rounds

Group I

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

3.98
4.51
-4.27
-4.21
-5.02
2.51
-4.48
-3.67
-4.30

Table

14

values together.

Group II
-3.23
-3.1.1
-2. 72
-3.72
-2.22
-4.32
-4.52
-2.33
-3.87

presents

a comparison

Group III

Group IV
-2.97
-4.37
-4.19
-4.99
-5.00
5.64
5.53
4.64
4.53

4.59
3.44
5.23
-3.77
5.11
-2.84
-3.59
-3.16
-2.69

of actual

and

predicted

Notice that the actual values are lower than

the predicted values on the average.

This is a result of the

averaging process used to generate the data.

An adjustment factor

(simply adding 2 in the direction of the sign of the actual values)
was used in adjusting the data which brings it into descriptive
harmony with the predetermined semantic set.
in Table 15.

The results are shown

That is, it was noticed that the predicted values over

stated or understated the actual values by approximately
2.

The cause of this is most probably due to the averaging process

used in determining the actual values.

From a correlation stand

point, this makes no real difference in the results, however
indicates that some questionnaire redesign is necessary in future
experiments.
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TABLE 14
ACTUAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOR VALUES VERSUS PREDICTED

Group I
mds
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Group II

Group III

Group IV

A

P

A

P

A

P

1.25
1.50
- .25
-1.00
-1.25
.25
- .75
.50
- .50

3.98
4.51
-4.27
-4.21
-5.02
2.51
-4.48
-3.67
-4.30

0
1.00
2.50
.50
.50
.25
2.25
- .25
-2.00

-3.23
-3.11
-2.72
-3. 72
-2.22
-4.32
-4.52
-2.33
-3.87

0
.5
5.25
- .75
5.25
- .75
- .5
1.25
-1.25

4.59
3.44
5.32
-3. 77
5.11
-2.84
-3.59
-3.16
-2.69

A
- 3
-1.5
-2.25
-2.5
- 1
7.5
7.5
1.0
1. 75

P
-2.97
-4.37
-4.19
-4.99
-5.00
5.64
5.53
4.64
4.53

TABLE 15
ADJUSTED ACTUAL SYSTEM BEHAVIOR VALUES VERSUS PREDICTED

mds
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Group IV

Group III

Group II

Group I
A

P

A

P

A

P

3.25
3.50
-2.25
-3.00
-3.25
2.25
-2.75
2.50
-2.50

3.98
4.51
-4.27
-4.21
-5.02
2.51
-4.48
-3.67
-4.30

0
3.00
4. 50
2.50
2.50
2.25
4.25
-2.25
-4.00

-3.28
-3.11
-2.72
-3.72
-2.22
-4.31
-4.52
-2.33
-3.87

0
2.50
7.25
-2.75
8.25
-2.75
-2.50
3.25
-3.25

4.50
3.44
5.32
-3.77
5.11
-2.84
-3.59
-3.16
-2. 69

A
-5.00
-3.50
-4.25
-4.50
-3.00
9.50
9.50
3.00
3.75

P
-2.97
-4.37
-4.19
-4.99
-5.00
5.64
5.53
4.64
4.53
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Statistical Analysis

Correlation coefficients for the actual and predicted
values by groups are shown in Table 16, and, the coefficients for
the adjusted and predicted values are shown in Table 17.

TABLE 16
UNADJUSTED DATA— CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY GROUP

Groups

I

II

III

IV

.86

.05

.71

.85

Total for Data Set

.700

TABLE 17
ADJUSTED DATA— CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS BY GROUP

Groups

I
.85

II

III

IV

-.12

.75

.82

Total for Data Set

.700
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Groups I, IV, and III have the highest correlation coeffi
cients at .86, .85, and .71 respectively and are significant at the
.01 level.

Group II data uere uncorrelated.

The apparent reason

for the failure in this case seems to be due to the fact that the
management team had had more exposure to bargaining theory through
economics and management courses and personal background which made
them more effective in their negotiations.

The apparent result was

that the labor team felt it was losing and gave up.

This is reflected

in the fact that average bargaining intensities for this group was
the lowest set of the four.
intensity (involvement).

Thus, they reached solutions with less

Notice that the average intensity for the

union team was extremely low (1.9) indicating very little involvement.
As stated earlier, there was an attempt to block for this type of
problem, but this information was not revealed until after the experi
ment was over.

This is probably due to the students' desire to

receive the extra points for a grade.
A further external pressure possibly affecting the group was
the fact that the experiment for Group II was conducted the morning
of the day that Louisiana State University's basketball team was to
play on National television in the NCAA basketball tournament.

Since

the students were all male and had been discussing their interest in
seeing the game, there may have been pressure to hurry up and get it
over with.

However, even if one includes what appears to be a set of

nine bad observations in the total set of data, the thirty-six obser
vations still yield a correlation coefficient of .700.
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Table 17 shows that the adjustment has some minor effects
on the correlation coefficients, but results are essentially the
same.

From an aesthetic sense, the adjusted data is more appealing

to work with though the original data gives somewhat better results.
This occurs because the adjusted values are closer to those in the
original descriptive model.

Conclusions

From the results presented, one can conclude that the correla
tion coefficients seem to give added strength to the argument for
the validity of the cusp-catastrophe model of collective bargaining.
Both actual and adjusted values for groups I, II, and IV are quite
high "explaining" not less than 50% of the variance and up to 72%
of the variance for these three groups.

Even the correlation

coefficients of the total data set including the group II information
is quite high at .70.
While the results are highly encouraging, the small sample
size definitely suggests caution in applying the model.

Perhaps the

best way to describe the situation is to say that the results are
strongly encouraging and suggest that further study is definitely
warranted.
This study, along with the Murthy results, provides one of
the more thorough tests of a catastrophe theory model in the social
sciences.

For the most part there has been no empirical testing of

any of the proposed models.

Zeeman's prison study data cited earlier
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really provides very little in the way of a test of the cusp as it
is simply a plot of control variables with the behavior variable
superimposed on the data that seem to fit inside a rather arbitrarily
drawn cusp.
The Oliva/Capdevielle model has gone through several evolu
tionary stages to its present state.

However it is-recognized that

more work and refinement is necessary on the descriptive aspects
as well as further testing to support or disprove the validity of
the model.

At the least it seems to provide a new means for

modelling the various characteristics of the bargaining system's
behavior from strike to lockout.

Recommendations for Further Study

The first recommendation for further study would be to
increase the number of observations.

This could be done in any one

of, or in all these ways:
A. Increase the number of measurements taken during
the game by administering the questionnaire after
each article.
B. Increase the length of the game, perhaps running
it all day or over several days.
C. Increase the number of experimental runs.
Due to the experience with the second group, it is critical
to watch the scheduling of the experiments.

Even though the incen

tives were good, there are certain short term situations which can
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interfere with the process, in this case, a basketball game
Furthermore, a fix on the incentive may cause some distortion
in the background information provided by prospective subjects.
A possible guard against this is an extensive interview with the
subjects prior to the experiment.

Unfortunately, the time and cost

rise significantly.
Redesign of the questionnaires is also in order.

Question

naire one should be reduced to perhaps one or at most two questions,
while the scale in questionnaire two should indicate that the negotia
tion range goes up to strike in one direction and up to lockout in
the other.

In some cases there seemed to be some confusion at the

start of the game regarding the negotiating response range.

The

change in question one is to get the responses in the minimum amount
of time with the minimum description.
Lastly, other designs need to be developed, particularly
those involving the use of real-world data.

It would seem that the

development of indices and bargaining intensities from real-world
data using factor analysis, regression analysis, or some other
statistical technique may be practical for those who have easy
access to the business world.
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APPENDIX A

A G R E E M E N T

Article 1:

Coverage

The bargaining unit is made up of all production and maintenance
employees of the employer, excluding professional, managerial,
supervisory, and clerical employees.
Article 2:

Term

The term of this agreement begins on April 1, 1977, and continues
through March 31, 1979. On or before February 1, 1979, one party
officially notifies the other party, in writing, that it wants to
end it.
Article 3:

Recognition of Union and Management Functions

The Employer recognizes the union as the exclusive representative
of all employees covered by this agreement for the purpose of
collective bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, and other conditions of employment.
The union
recognizes that the employer has the right, on its own initiative,
to perform any function of management at any time, so long as it
does not violate any provision of this agreement.
Article 4:

Holidays

The following days are on holiday list: New Year's Day, Good
Friday, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day,
and Christmas Day. An employee is eligible for holiday benefits
unless he is absent without permission or is on leave of absence.
The company may decide which jobs normally operate and which jobs
normally close down on holidays.
Article 5:

Service

In the normal circumstances, an employee's service accumulates in
his regular classification.
Article 6:

Proof of Service

In computing service, the records of personnel administration
department shall be conclusive.
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Article 7:

Assignment

It is the function of management to assign employees to jobs,
classifications, training, and transfer.
Such assignments
shall be made by the company based on abilities, qualifications,
seniority, and prevailing circumstances.
Article 8:

Hours

The workweek is a period of five consecutive days beginning with
Mayday.
The working period is 7:45 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. with a 30
minutes lunch break.
In unusual circumstances, the employer may
qhange the workweek and the working period.
Article 9:

Seniority

One employee has higher job service than another employee if
1) He has longer service of the kind in question, or
2) Service of the kind in question is equal, and he has
more service of the highest lower kind.
For purposes of determining seniority, all classifications are
considered equal.
Article 10:

Layoff

Before laying off employees, the company will notify the union of
the impending layoff at least one month before its effective date.
Employees scheduled for layoff will be permitted to voluntarily
retire, provided they can qualify for early retirement, or
voluntarily resign and receive severance pay.
Article 11:

Order must be obeyed

When an employees feels aggrieved because of an order, he shall
nevertheless obey the order, provided it does not involve serious
danger to life.
Article 12:

Qualification

It is the function of management to fix the qualifications for each
job and post. The determination of abilities and qualifications
of an employee shall be made by the company. The company may select
an employee of less seniority for a higher job on the basis of
ability and qualifications rather than on the basis of seniority
alone.

132

Article 13:

Conditions which temporarily interrupt service

An employee is absent under conditions which temporarily interrupt
service when he is absent from work, unless the absence is with
permission, is followed by a return to work without interruption
of employee status and appears on the following list:
1) An absence which has continued for not more than 10
consecutive calendar days.
2) An
absence for active military service.
3) An
absence while on loan by the company.
4) An
absence for sickness or accident of theemployee,
provided a doctor certifies that the absence is
necessary.
5) An absence for vacation.
Article 14:

Work Stoppages

There shall be no lockouts or strikes under any circumstances during
the term of this agreement.
Article 15:

Overtime

Time and one-half shall be payable after the 40-hour period in a
workweek.
The employer may schedule an employee for overtime work
with or without prior notice.
In the normal circumstances, such
overtime is worked after eight hours have been worked in the day.
Article 16:

Grievance Procedure

A claim that the company has violated this agreement is forfeited
unless it is presented within 10 calendar days after the alleged
violation occurs.
This is true even though a continuing violation
is alleged.
Union may present the grievance in writing to the
department head concerned.
If the department head does not hear
the grievance within 10 days after the request, the union may
arrange a conference with the manager.
The answer made by the
company must be writing.
The company's answer is final and
binding, and no provisions for appeal or arbitration are provided
herein.
Article 17:

Vacation

An employee is eligible for vacation during a particular calendar
year if his total service since the date of his employment or
reinstatement is one year or more. An eligible employee is
entitles to at least two weeks of vacation as follows:
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Years of Total Service
less than 5
5
10
20

Weeks of Vacation
2
3
4
5

The vacation shall be scheduled according to a preselected vacation
list in one period, except in unusual circumstances. Deadline for
making selections shall be April 1 of each year. Weekends and
holidays shall not be excluded from vacation period. When the
calendar year ends, the employee loses all of the vacation he has
not yet taken.
In unusual circumstances, the company may recall
an employee on vacation.
Article 18:

Miscellaneous

The company may discipline an employee if he commits one of the
posted offenses, with or without advance notice.
Even though an
employee does not commit a posted offence, his conduct or work
performance may still be a cause for discipline. When the company
disciplines an employee, it may impose any penalty which it deems
appropriate.
If the penalty imposed is discharge or suspension in
excess of 10 working days, the employee may appeal to determine
if the penalty was imposed after due process; however, reasonable
ness of penalty itself will not constitute ground for appeal.
Article 19:

Pay

In the normal circumstances, each employee shall be paid his rate
in the classification he is working for all time payable.
Classification
Auto mechanic
Machinist
Carpenter
Helper
Millwright
Operator
Pipefitter
Welder

Rate/hour
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38
$4.38

Except where this agreement says otherwise, straight time shall be
payable for time worked, and when absent for these reasons:
1) Death in the family
2) Conferring with management
3) Vacation
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Article 20:

Benefit plan

Nothing in this agreement shall affect the company's benefit plan
(a. Annuity plan; b. long-term disability insurance plan; c. Acci
dental death benefit plan; d. Contributory group life insurance
plan; e. Family health insurance plan) or the administration thereof.
The union waives its rights to bargain the provisions of the company's
benefit plan.
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APPENDIX B

DISSERTATION QUESTIONNAIRE

Background
Name _____________________________
Age

_______

Sex

Male

Female

List other Management Courses taken:

Do you consider yourself to be:
Pro Labor

Pro Management

Neutra

Directions
You will find 20 groups of statements listed below. Each group
is composed of three statements. Each statement refers to a way o f'
thinking about things or people in general. They reflect opinions
and not matters of fact -- there are no "right" or "wrong" answers
and different people have been found to agree with different
s tatements.
Please read each of the three statements in each group. Then
decide first which of the statements is mosttrue orcomes
the
closest to describing your ownbeliefs. Circle
a plus (+) in the
space provided.
Just decide which of the remaining two statements is mos t false
or is the farthest from your own beliefs. Circle the minus [HI In
the space provided.
Most
Most
Here is an example:
True
False
A.
B.
C.

It is easy to persuade people but hard to keep
them persuaded.
Theories that run counter to common sense are a
waste of time.
It is only common sense to go along with what
other people are doing and not be too different.

+
(+)

(E)

In this case, statement B would be the one you believe in most
strongly and A and C would be ones that are not as characteristic
of your opinion. Statement C would be the one you believe in least
strongly and is least characteristic of your beliefs.
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You will find some of the choices easy to make; others will be
quite difficult.
Do not fail to make a choice no matter how hard it
may be.
You will mark two statements in each group of three -the one that comes the closest to your own beliefs with a + and the
one farthest from your beliefs with a -.
The remaining statement
should be left unmarked.
Do not omit any groups of statements.

MACH V

Most

Most

1 rue

Fals

1. A.

It takes m o r e i m a g i n a t i o n to be a su c ce ss fu l cr im i na l than a
s u c c e s s f u l b u s i n e s s man.
B. Th e ph ra s e "the road to h ell is paved w it h good inte n ti on s"
c o n t ai n s a lot of truth.
C. M o s t m e n fo rget m o r e eas il y the d e a t h of their fa ther than the
loss of th ei r property.

2. A. M e n are m o r e c on c e r n e d w i t h the car they d ri ve than with the
c lo th es their w i v e s wear.
B. It is v e r y i mportant that i m a g i n a t i o n and cr e a t i v i t y in ch ildren
be cultivated.
C. P e op le s u f f e r i n g from i n c ur ab le dis ea s es sho ul d have the choice
of b ei n g put p a i n l e s s l y to death.
3.

A. N e v e r tell a ny o n e the real r e a so n you did so m e t h i n g unle ss it is
u s e f ul to do so.
B. Th e w e l l - b e i n g of the ind iv id u al is the goal that should be w o r ke d
for b e f or e a n y t h i n g else.
C. Once a truly i nt el l i g e n t p er s o n m ak es up his m i n d about the ans w er
to a p r o b l e m he ra re l y c o nt i n u e s to th in k about it.

+
-)+

+
^
+

+
+
+

4.

A. Peop l e are g e t t i n g so lazy an d s el f - i n d u l g e n t that it isbad for our
country.
B. Th e best w a y to h an d l e peop le is to tell them what they want to hear. +
C. It would be a good thing if p e op le w e re ki nd e r to others less
f o r t un at e than themselves.
+

5.

A. Mo s t peo pl e are b a s i c a l l y good and kind.
B. The best c r i t e r i a for a w i fe or hu s ba nd is c o m p a t i b i l i t y — other
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are nice but not essential.
C. Only af ter a m a n has g o t te n what he wan t s fr om life sho ul d be c o n 
c ern h im s el f w i t h the in ju s ti ce s in the world.

6.

7.

+
+
-r

A. Most peop le who get ahead in the w o r l d lead clean, m o r a l lives.
B. Any m a n w o r t h his salt should n' t be b la m e d for pu t t i n g his c a r e e r
above his family.
C. P e op le w o u l d be b e t t e r off if they w e re c o nc er ne d less w i t h h ow
to do things and m o r e w i t h w hat to do.

+

A. A go od te ac he r is one w h o poi nt s out u n a n s w e r e d qu es t i o n s rathe r

+

than gives e x p l i ci t answers.

+
+
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Most
True
B. W h e n you ask so m e o n e to do s o m e t h i n g for you, it is best to give
the real re as o ns for w a n t i n g it r a th er than giv in g rea sons wh ic h
m i g h t ca r ry m o r e weight.
C. A p e rs o n ' s job is the best s i n g l e gu i d e as to the sort of per so n he
is.

Most
?:T ,~

4

8. A. The c o n s t r u c t i o n of such m o n u m e n t a l w o r k s as the E g y p t i a n pyr a mi ds
wa s w o r t h the e n s l a v e m e n t of the w o r k e r s w h o built them.
B. Once a w a y of h a n d l i n g p r o b l e m s has b e en w o r k e d out it is best to
st ic k to it.
C. One sho ul d t ake a c t i o n o nl y w h e n sure that it is m o r a l l y right.
9. A. The w o r l d w o u l d be a m u c h b e t t e r p l a c e to live in if pe ople
w o u l d let the futu re take care of itsel f and co n c e r n th em se lv e s
o nly w i t h e n j o y i n g the present.
B. It is w i s e to fl a t t e r i mp or ta n t people.
C. O nce a d e c i s i o n has been made, it is b es t to keep c h a n g i n g it us
n e w c i r c u m s t a n c e s arise.
10. A.

It is a good p ol i c y to act as if yo u are d o i n g the things you do
b ec a u s e you h av e no other choice.
B. Th e bi g ge st d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n mo s t c r i m i n a l s and o th e r p e o pl e is
that c ri mi n al s are st upid e n o u g h to get caught.
C. Ev e n the m o s t h a r d e n e d an d v i c i o u s c r i mi na l has a s pa rk of decenc>
somewh er e w i t h i n him.

4

+

11.

Al l in all, it is b e t t e r to be h u m bl e and ho nest than to be importan t
+
an d dishon est.
B. A man w ho is able and w i l l i n g to w o r k hard has a good c h a n ce of
+
s u c c e e d i n g in w h a t e v e r he w a n t s to do.
C. If a thing d o e s not help us in ou r d a i l y lives, it isn't very
4
important.

12.

A.

13.

A.

A p e r so n s h o u ld n' t be p u n i s h e d for b r e a k i n g a law w h i c h he thinks
is u nreasonable.
B. T oo m a n y c r i m i n a l s are not p u n i s h e d for their crimes.
C. Th e re is no e x c u se for lying to so me on e else.

4
4
4

G e n e r a l l y s peaking, m e n w o n ' t w o r k h ard u n l es s th ey're for c ed to do S O .
E v e r y p e rs o n is e n t i t l e d to a seco nd chance, e ve n after he co mm i ts
4
a s e rious m istake.
4
C. P e o p le wh o can't m a k e up th eir m i n d s aren ' t w o r t h b o t h e r i n g about.

A.
B.

4
1A. A. A m a n ' s first r e s p o n s i b i l i t y is to hi s wife, not hi s mother.
4
B. M ost m e n are brave.
C. It's best to p i c k f ri en d s that are i n t e l l e c t u a l l y s t i m u l a t i n g rather
*fthan o nes it is c o m f o r t a b l e to be around.

4

—
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Most
True
15.

16.

17.

A. Th er e are v e r y few p e o pl e in the w o r l d w o r t h c o n c e r n i n g o ne self
about.
B. It is ha r d to get ah ea d w i t h o u t c ut t i n g co rners h ere and there.
C. A c a p a b l e p e r s o n m o t i v a t e d for his own gain is m ore useful to
s o c i e t y than a w e l l - m e a n i n g but i ne ff e c t i v e one.

+

A. It is be s t to give ot he r s the i m p r es s io n that you can change your
m i n d easily.
B. It is a good w o r k i n g p o l i c y to k eep on good terms w i t h everyone.
C. H o n e s t y is the be s t p o l ic y in all cases.

+
+
+

A. It is p o s s i b l e to be good in all respects.
B. To he l p o ne s e l f is good; to help o t he rs even better.
C. W a r an d t h re a ts of w a r are u n c h a n g e a b l e facts of hu man

+
+
+

life.

+
1

18.

A. B a r n u m w a s p r o b a b l y right w h e n he said that th ere's at least one
s u c k e r b o r n e v e r y mi n u t e .
+
B. L i fe is p r e t t y d ul l u n l e s s one d e l i b e r a t e l y stirs up some excitement.
C. M os t pe op l e w o u l d be b e t t e r off if they c o n t r o l l e d their emotions.

19.

A. S e n s i t i v i t y to the f e e li ng s of othe rs is w o r t h m or e than poise in
s o c i al situ a ti on s.
B. The ideal s o c i e t y is one w h e r e e v e r y b o d y knows his pl ace and
a c c e p t s it.
C. It is safest to a s s u m e that all pe o p l e have a v i c i o u s streak and
it wi l l come out w h e n t hey ar e given a chance.

20.

P e o p l e who talk about ab st r a c t p r o b l e m s u s ua l ly don't know what
they are ta l k i n g about.
B. A n y o n e w h o c o m p l e t e l y tru st s anyo n e e lse is a s k in g for trouble.
C. It is e s s e n t i a l for the f u n c t i o n i n g of a d em o c r a c y that everyone
votes.

*
+
+

A.

+
+
+

Most
Psii-s

APPENDIX C
LAYOUT OF EXPERIMENTAL SETTING

Bargaining
Ro o m

T e a m R oom

O

= au di o pi c k-up

Team Room
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APPENDIX D
Questionnaire 1
Team # _______________
Round //

Directions:

Name
Date

Read each question carefully and circle the appropriate
response which reflects your feelings on how the round
just completed went.
The scale values are: 0 = to no
extent, 4 = to some extent, 8 = to a very great extent.

1. To what extent do you feel that the other team may have been
unduly rigid or inflexible in its negotiating.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

2. To what extent did you get emotionally involved in this round
of bargaining.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

3. To what extent did you find yourself unwilling to compromise
any further.
0

1

2

3

4

4

6

7

8

4. To what extent do you feel that the results of this round
were unequitable to your team.
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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APPENDIX E
Questionnaire 2
Team # _______________
Round #

Directions:

Name_
Date

Answer each qeustion by circling the appropriate
response which reflects your feelings of the overall
situation.

1. At this point in time, how would you evaluate the overall
situation?

Strike

Strike
Imminent

5

Union
Militant

Union
Hostile

Union
Tense

3

2

1

4

Management
Tense
-1

Neutral
0

Management
Hostile

Management
Militant

Lockout
Imminent

Lockout

-2

-3

-4

-5

2. Was there a sudden shift in your opponent's collective behavior?

yes

no

APPENDIX F
Data From Questionnaire 1
Question 1
Rounds 1

Rounds 2

Rounds 3

Rounds 4

Rounds 5

Rounds 6

Rounds 7

Rounds 8

Rounds 9

Group 1
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
3
4

4
1
1
1

6

1
2
3
4

2

6

0
1
0

7
2

1

1
X

3
4
2
3

3
4
2
3

0
0
0

7
7
6
8

2
2

2

1

6
4
7
7

2

5
2

5
3

8
4

6

2

6

2

6

2

5

0

4
3
3
4

5
3
2

6
4

4
3

2
0

0

0

0

9

8

0

0

1
2
3
4

4
4
5
5

1
1
1
0

6
7
7
8

3
4
2
0

1
2
3
4

2
1
0
0

4
5

3
5
0
0

5
8
5
6

4
2

4
4
5
5

Group 2
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

3

5
3

0
1

Group 3
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

0

1

3
3
4

2

2

0

0

8
8
6
8

8

4
2
4
5

4
5

2

2
3

Group 4
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

0
0

8
6
8

6

6
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Data From Questionnaire 1
Question 2
Rounds 1

Rounds 2

Rounds 3

Rounds 4

Rounds 5

Rounds 6

Rounds 7

Rounds 8

Rounds 9

Group 1
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

4
3
5
6

5
3
6
7

6
3
4
6

7
5
7
8

1
0
1
4

3
5
6
7

2
2
4
7

4
5
7
8

1
4
1
0

2
2
1
5

2
4
3
8

2
2
3
0

1
0
0
0

3
3
0
3

5
4
3
8

3
0
1
4

3
3
1
5

1
2
3
4

4
4
5
5

1
1
3
4

5
4
6
6

3
5
4
4

4
5
5
6

2
3
4
1

3
4
3
4

3
2
2
0

4
1
2
0

1
2
3
4

0
3
0
0

3
6
1
2

4
5
1
1

5
7
2
7

7
7
4
8

6
8
5
8

6
8
5
8

7
7
4
6

6
3
4
5

1
2
3
4

2
0
3
4

1
2
3
4

'

Group 2
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player
Group 3

M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player
Group 4

M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player
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Data Frora Questionnaire 1
Question 3
Rounds 1

Rounds 2

Rounds 3

Rounds 4

Rounds 5

Rounds 6

0

6
5

6
2

1

1

1

1

3
4
3
3

1

6

6

1
2
3
4

2
0
0
0

2
0
0
7

6
4

4
4

2
0

6

0

0

5

1
2
3
4

4
7
4
4

7
2

Rounds 7

Rounds 8

Rounds 9

Group 1
M
M
L
L

Player 1
Player 2
Player 3
Player 4

0

1

8
5

2

8
0
1

6
3
3

2

1

4

4
5

1
0

4

8

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

7

0

2

7
8
4
6

2
3
2
0

7
7
4
6

0
3
5

4
3
2

0

1

4
4
6
7

7
4
4
2

7
4
4
6

7

7
5
6
8

0
1
1

7
2
4

Group 2
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

3

Group 3
M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

1

2
1
5

0

0
3
2

0

Group 4
Player
Player
Player
Plaver

1
2
3
4

8
8
8

8
0
4
5

7
5
3
3

m

M
M
L
L

Data From Questionnaire 2
Question 1

M
M
L
L

M
M
L
L

M
M
L
L

M
M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

Player
Player
Player
Player

Player
Player
Player
Player

Player
Player
Player
Player

Rounds 2

Rounds 3

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Avg.

-1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
- .25

1.0

0.5

0.5

0.0
0.0

2.0
2.0

2.0
2.0

Avg.

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
1.0
1.25

Avg.

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0

Avg.

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4

1
2
3
4

-

1.0
1.0
1.0
1.0

Rounds 4

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-

-

-

2.0
1.0
1.0
2.0

-3.0
2.0

Rounds 6

-

1.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.0
2.0
0.5

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

1.0

-

Rounds 7

-

Rounds 8

1.0

1.0

2.0
2.0
2.0
1.25

1.0

Rounds 9

1.0
2.0
1.0
2.0
1.5

2.0
2.0
1.5

1.0

2.0

0.0

2.0

1.0

0.0

0.0
2.0
1.25

0.0
0.0
0.0

1.0
0.0
0.0

1.0
0.0
.75

0.0

0.0
1.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0

1.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0

0.0
0.0

3.0
3.0

1.0
2.0

0.0
-

Rounds 5

1.0

0.0

-

1.0

0.0
0.0
0.0

-

0.0

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0
0.0

1.0

-

1.0

1.25

£U'

Rounds 1

Data From Questionnaire 2
Question 2

Rounds 1

M
M
L
L

M
M
L
L

M
M
L
L

M

M
L
L

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
3
4

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
3
4

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
3
4

Player
Player
Player
Player

1
2
3
4

Rounds 2

Rounds 3

Rounds 4

Rounds 5

/

/
/

Rounds 7

Rounds 8

Rounds 9

/
/

/
/

/

Rounds 6

/

/
/

/
/

/

/
/

/
/

/
/
/

146

APPENDIX G
ROTATED INTENSITIES

Group I
Management
Labor

6.25
.35

3.53
.24

6.25
.12

2.59
-1.89

6.72
.35

2.71
1.06

8.96
.24

--1. 60
- .99

2.71
1.06

5.02
.87

-

3.98

-4.12
- .38
4.15

-4.27
. 64
3.63

-4.21
- . 23
4.44

Group II

-3.22

-3.11
.22
3.38

-2.71

Group III

-4.38
- .21
4.59

3.44

-2.97

- 4 . 37

6.26
0.59

2.59
.71

Group III
Management
Labor
Group IV
Management
Labor

Group II
Management
Labor

-

5.66
-1.18

-

4.24
. 24

6.95
.83

6.72
.12

-

1.41
. 24

3.54
-1.41

7.19
-1.53

1.53
. 35

. 59
. 59

4.36
-2.00

4.01
- . 71

8.72

3.18
.35

3.77
- .47

3.18
- . 12

7.61
. 87

8.67
. 42

10.61
0

10.09
.19

6.91
.31

-5.02
. 88
4.14

2.51

-4.88
.87
3.16

-3.6 7
.22
3.45

-4.30
- .50
4.79

-3.72

-2.22

-4.32

-4.52
.07
4.45

-2.33
.78
1.56

-3.87

-5.13
- . 11
5.24

-3.77
.73
3.04

-5.11
0
5. 11

1
ro
00
.o

5.30
.83

3.30
1.54

. 45
3.29

-3.59
.51
3.08

-3.16
.15
3 . 01

2.69
. 21
2.48

-4.19
.72
3.47

4.99
. 46
4.53

-5.00
- .20
5.19

-5.64
0
5.64

—5 . 4 6
.07
5.54

- 4 . 4h
. '8
4. (, i

-4.99
.46
4.53

-

-

-

0

-

-

2.24
.12

-

7.61
. 87

Solution Set of Predicted Val
Group I

Group IV

-

147

148

VITA

Christel Mary Capdevielle was born in New Orleans,
Louisiana, December 29, 1954, the daughter of Louis and Sybil
Capdevielle.

After completing her work at Ursuline Academy,

during which time she was named to the Reader's Digest National
Speakers Corps, she entered Louisiana State University and
graduated in December 1975 with a Bachelor of Science degree
in Marketing.

While pursuing her undergraduate degree she was

named to Phi Kappa Phi, Beta Gamma Sigma, Mortar Board, and
Omicron Delta Kappa.

She was named Outstanding Freshman Woman

at LSU and held the T.H. Harris and Arthur Anderson Foundation
Scholarships.
In January 1976, Ms. Capdevielle entered the doctoral
program in Management at Louisiana State University.

She served

as President of Beta Gamma Sigma, faculty advisor for Phi Chi
Theta, and as an Instructor in the Department of Management during
1978-1979.

She was awarded the Richard D. Irwin Foundation

Fellowship for her dissertation research.

E X A M IN A T IO N

A N D TH ESIS R E P O R T

Candidate:

Chris tel Mary Capdevielle

Major Field:

Management

T itle of Thesis:

Phase II in the Experimental Evaluation of the Oliva/Capdevielle
Cusp Catastrophe Model of Collective Bargaining.

Approved:

Ci
Major Professor and Chairman

th.
D ean of the Graduate£/School
Iraduate£ySi

EX A M IN IN G C O M M ITTEE:

Q tu J)o@Qma

Date of Examination:

/ / ? 7?

